Woodward's Book - State of Denial

I just finished Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War Part III and I want to recommend it to you all. As a rule, I am leery of pro- and anti- Bush books, but Woodward has a reputation for credibility and unparalleled access to decisionmakers that compelled me to read the book. Having read the book, I can't say that my worldview has been dramatically altered, but I do get a feeling that it has been clarified and deepened.

Despite the title and the press buzz, I didn't feel the book was overly organized around a theme or that it drove to a particular conclusion. Rather, it seemed to me that the following themes emerged and competed for attention:

Rumsfeld's conflict with and dominance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jay Garner's Post war planning and experience
Conflicts between DoD, the NSC and State Department
Conflicts over and Incoherence of the post war strategy
Conflicts between Administration representation of the war and the facts on the ground
Bush's insulation from and lack of interest in details of policy
The Administrations use and misuse of intelligence
Rumsfeld is a problem

Of these themes, only two came across to me as projections of Woodward's point of view. The most obvious is the pervasive criticism of Rumsfeld who is depicted as dominating the Joint Chiefs, resisting cooperation with the NSC and Staed Department, and being given free reign by the President. Even though Woodward gives Rumsfeld many opportunities to speak for himself, it is hard come away from the book without seeing Rumsfeld as an obstacle to success. Given the fairly widespread criticism of Rumsfeld, it is likely that the book simply reflects the preponderance of opinion that Woodward encountered in his interviews, but this very preponderance invites the concern that it may be biased. However, such a concern should lead readers to cross examine the book, not to reject it.

The second theme of concern to me was the President's lack of attention to policy. Bush's lack of engagement in policy debates has been frequently reported and will probably be a subject of significant historical debate and analysis. Wooward gives us more examples and also give insight into the ways in which advisors and staff fail to provide information contrary to the administration's operating assumption to the President. The author also reports widespread assessments that Bush focused more on moral support (i.e., cheerleading) than engagement in policy formation. While the depth and breadth Woodward's access to policymakers gives credence to this representation, I was probably receptive to it because it fit my view of the administration, and, therefore, it again set me on edge.

Of greater concern to me, was Woodward's repeated criticism of Bush for not asking more questions. This seemed to be coming from Woodward more than from his sources. At one point in the book, Wooward wonders why Bush didn't ask Gen Abizaid to give him a detailed briefing on his strategy to defeat the anti-coalition fighters (they weren't calling them insurgents yet) and secure Iraq. At other times, when describing meetings in which advisors did not share negative assessments with the President, Woodward points out that Bush also didn't ask for such views. This may be a wholly valid criticism, but it does seem to be mostly Woodward's and should be cross examined more thoroughly.

Despite these reservations, the book is well worth reading. Indeed, given the complexity of its content, I think it would be more of a mistake than usual to rely on excerpts and commentary to understand its content. Furthermore, given the attention a Wooward book typically gets in the political discourse, I think it would be a mistake to ignore its contents. Therefore, I would describe this as a must read even if one must reserve judgment.