Emerging Diplomacy on Iraq

It looks as if the White House has finally put diplomacy on the front burner. When I earlier wrote that diplomacy was critically needed, I wasn't sure the administration would move in that direction. In many ways, the recent diplomatic activity is more reassuring than Rumsfeld's replacement. However, it is not yet clear how the diplomacy will play out, especially with regard to three questions:

1. Will the regional powers engage in a process and commit resources in Iraq?
2. Will the US do what is necessary to gain cooperation?
3. What will the US' role be in this process?

First, while Bush's visit to the NATO conference at Riga and then to Jordan is getting the most attention, Cheney's visit to Saudi Arabia is possibly more significant. The Saudi royal family is almost as close to the Bush family as James Baker and they have a huge stake in the region's stability. They also undoubtedly share the administration's concern about Iran's growing influence in the region. If there is to be a regional conference on Iraq, a regional power will probably have to promote it. I have been very curious to see who does so and it may be that the Saudis will be the ones.

Second, while Bush is certainly working the diplomatic front, he is still maintaining the no compromise rhetoric. If you look closely, most of the talk about redeployments, Iran & Syria involvement, and conferences comes from outside the administration. This is probably the White House's preliminary bargaining strategy or at least an attempt to avoid "negotiating with itself". However, Bush has often said that we need to listen to what he says to understand what he is going to do. So there is a seed of doubt in my mind as to whether he will make the compromises that an effective diplomatic process will require.

Of course, with the handling of Rumsfeld's resignation, Bush put the lie to his own advice about listening to what he says. Indeed, the flip side of my concern that he won't compromise is a that he will have to renege on most of what he is saying. If, as was the case with Rumsfeld's resignation, the White House fully intends to do what they are emphatically saying they won't do, then it may lose what little credibility it has left.

This is not to damn Bush if he does and damn him if he doesn't. Rather I mean to damn him if he doesn't make the compromisesthat diplomacy requires, or to damn him for not using the noncommittal language that diplomacy also requires. To me this appears as another case in which the political and communication strategies that put Bush in office, and at which the administration truly excels, are inappropriate for the pursuit of foreign policy. It is going to be difficult for the administration to cooperate with a nation it has declared part of the "Axis of Evil".

Finally, if a diplomatic initiative gets under way, it is not clear that the US will, or should, be in the driver's seat. If there is to be a regional conference, it would be a good thing if it were proposed by a regional power, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt. However, to be effective, a conference will need the participation of all Iraq's neighbors to include Iran and Syria. Just agreeing to a conference with Iran and Syria would require a reversal of policy for the White House and participation will expose the US to criticism of its occupation and demands for withdrawal. Furthermore, there will be the inevitable pressure to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the traditional poison pill for US involvement in Mid East conferences.

It will be interesting to see not only if such a conference can take place, but also how much the US and regional powers are willing to compromise on the above issues. If the regional powers agree to participate without Syria or Iran, or if they agree to avoid issues that embarrass the US, then it will signal an extraordinary interest in resolving the conflict in Iraq. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if a separate regional effort develops to side step the above mentioned obstacles. Indeed, there is the possibility of regional negotiations leaving the US behind if the administration does not get out in front on the diplomacy. Such unity of effort would be a first for the region and so the possibility is more intriguing than likely. Even so, there is so much at stake here in terms of Shia-Sunni relations, opposing Al-Qaida, and balancing Iranian influence, that extraordinary steps may be taken.