The Coming Surge

It appears fairly certain that the president will announce a surge of troops into Iraq. The preparations are well under way, and indeed troops here at FortBragg have already received their orders (one brigade is returning to Iraq after some of its troops have been home for less than 2 months).

The replacement of military commanders is fortuitous. Gen Patreaus is the primary architect of the Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine. He can be expected to put the troops to use in Clear and Hold operations. Admiral Fallon has been in command of the Pacific theater and has been presumably been working on contingencies to deal with North Korea. One would expect him to focus on the apparently similar (but totally different) problem of Iran while leaving Iraq more to Patreaus. Having an Admiral as a boss may give Patreaus a freer hand in using his forces, how ever many he has.

Which brings us to the size of the surge. Reports put the number anywhere from 9 to 40 thousand, with 20 being the most common number. Here we get to one of two big problems. At the low end of the scale, you are sending too few to make any difference. At the higher end (or even the middle), you are sending so many that you "break the bank" and impair the military's ability to maintain troop levels in the future. Undoubtedly this has been the number 1 technical issue discussed at the Pentagon.

The other big problem is that it doesn't matter how many troops you send or who you put in command. The problems are political and economic, and therefore need political and economic solutions. What comes out of State Department will be far more important than what comes out of the Pentagon (or Central Command).

I noted with interest the move of John Negroponte from Director of National Intelligence to Deputy Secretary of State. With his experience at the UN and in Baghdad, Negroponte is probably the best person in the administration to carry out the kind of diplomacy that is needed. Moving Khalizad from Baghdad to the UN may also help (although one wonders where his stock now stands with the administration).

I have no clue about sports, other than cycling, and so sports analogies are always tricky for me. However, the current situation could be likened to the second half of a football game and we are down at least two TDs. The military is our defensive line and everything to do with surges and generals is defense. The White House and State Department are the offensive line, and, if you want any hope of winning the game, you have to look to them for the victory.

Now, to torture this analogy, if the other side has the ball, you have to get it away from them. This is the argument behind the surge. Putting in troops to stabilize the situation so that political and economic progress can occur is the equivalent of forcing a turnover. And, just like a turnover, it depends on the other team's play (and luck) as much as on what our team does. (Stop the analogy, I want to get off before its too late.)

So in plain terms, a surge is a risky military strategy because it depends on the political strategy for success (i.e., what happens when you hold an area that you have cleared) and it diminishes the military resources available in the future (i.e., the more you commit now, the less you have later). A significant surge makes sense if it is link to aggressive diplomacy and decision to drawdown following the surge, regardless of the outcome. Indeed, the larger the surge, the more inevitable the drawdown. If it works, you'll be able to drawdown. If it is doesn't, militarily and politically you'll have to do it anyway.