Now it's the Ukrainian Crisis

I have been referring to the Russia annexation of Crimea as the Crimean Crisis, party in the hope that it would remain confined to that area. Unfortunately, the unrest has spread to other parts of Eastern Ukraine and so it must be called the Ukrainian Crisis.

The violence that is emerging in Donetsk and other cities in Eastern Ukraine is exactly the kind of thing one would expect to trigger a Russian intervention. Indeed, the lack of violence in Crimea was part of what made Russia's intervention in Crimea so surprising. Of course, in Crimea, many Russian troops were already there and they just had to fly more into their base. While Russia has 40,000 troops massed on Eastern Ukraine's border, the fact that they have to cross the border is a symbolic and legal obstacle to intervening that was not present in Crimea. Crossing the border amounts amounts to crossing a threshold that will escalate the crisis.

Also, the fact that Russia intervened in Crimea first will undercut any Russian claims that they are simply responding to violence against ethnic Russians, as they rather successfully claimed when they invaded Georgia. Of course, it is hard to see this as much of a deterrent if wide spread violence occurs, but it has certainly put them on the back foot as far as international reaction is concerned.

I do not profess to have a crystal ball, and certainly didn't see the rapid occupation of Crimea coming, but I don't see the situation in Eastern Ukraine going well. Pro-Russian groups have almost certainly been emboldened by Russia occupation of Crimea and its massing of troops on the border. Therefore, they probably think that all they need to do it cause some trouble and get into a little fight with government troops (as opposed to firmly taking control of the region) to trigger a Russian invasion. The Ukrainian government, with larger numbers of pro-Ukrainian citizens in the the East than in Crimea (and no Russian forces there yet) cannot easily avoid a fight. Indeed, not reacting to the uprising (or completely botching the reaction, as the Ukrainian government is in danger of doing) would effectively cede the region.

The question then is how does the Ukrainian "Anti-Terror" campaign go? If the Ukrainian government can gain firm control of the region, one could imagine Russia contenting itself with using political and economic pressure on Ukraine. Indecisive fighting and any kind of publicized major loss of life will make it hard for Russia to sit there with 40,000 troops on the border and do nothing. Of course, this could be what Putin is waiting for as it would provide a fairly good pretext for intervening.

Indeed, whether by accident or design, the events in Eastern Ukraine are far better orchesterated than those in Crimea. In Crimea, the pro-Russian groups seized the local parliament and declared for Russia from the start (the referendum, held under Russian occupation, appeared to be an after thought). In Eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian groups are demanding a referendum from the Ukrainian government, which puts the government in the position of seeming to deny them the right to vote on the issue. While there is a lot of legitimacy in refusing to agree to a referendum at gun point, it does muddy the waters. If things get out of hand in Eastern Ukraine, the Russian could push for OSCE involvement and use international law and organizations (or at east their refusal/inability to act) for its own purposes. 

With the Chinese curse of "May you live in interesting times" in mind, the situation is getting more interesting by the day.

Here are some misc thought and links:

 In "Do Crimeans actually want to join Russia?", Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson look at regional attitudes within Ukraine towards identity issues relevant to the crisis. In the various bar graphs they offer, one can clearly see the East-West divide on issues such as language and orientation towards Europe vs Russia. However, it is worth noting that Eastern Ukraine is not as unified in its pro-Russia attitudes as is Crimea. Therefore we can expect much more dissension among the population and, sadly, perhaps much more violence among them. 

The less Americans know about Ukraine’s location, the more they want U.S. to intervene:  The authors report survey results in which only 16% of respondents could find Ukraine on a map. The survey used an interactive map that recorded where respondents actually thought Ukraine was and , thus, could measure how far off they were. While only 13% supported using force against Russia, support for using force increased with the inaccuracy of respondents placement of Ukraine on the map.

Meanwhile, in Russia, BBC reports that a website has been launched that seeks to connect Ukrainian women looking for a place to live in Russia with Russia men who will offer them accommodation in exchange for... well it's pretty sexist. The interesting points here are the implicit assumption (perhaps even fact) that there are large numbers of Ukrainians seeking refuge from the new government in Ukraine, and the labeling of the new Ukrainian government as Banderite. Apparently, Stepan Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist who took advantage of the Nazi invasion of Russia to declare Ukrainian independence and sought Germany as an ally in this effort. Despite the fact that the Nazis shipped him to a concentration camp, Bandera was eventually killed by the KGB and vilified in Soviet propaganda as a Nazi collaborator.

Bandera is a divisive figure in Ukraine, having been embraced by Ukrainian nationalists. In 2010, then Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko (and current leader of the Our Ukraine party) controversially  awarded Bandera the title of Hero of the Ukraine (which was later annulled). Statues have been erected to Bandera in Western Ukraine, a commemorative stamp issued in honor of his 100th birthday, and Wikipedia features a photo of Lviv (Bandera's birthplace) soccer fans displaying a banner with his picture with the caption "Bandera- Our Hero" at a soccer game versus Donetsk (ground zero in the latest pro-Russia demonstrations/violence).

The embrace of Bandera by Ukrainian nationalists and his association with the Nazis in Soviet era propaganda  undoubtedly plays a role in the Russian government's claims that the new Ukrainian government is controlled by fascists and the Russian public's belief in those claims. Keep in mind that the fight against Germany in the "Great Patriotic War" is a huge part of Russian culture. For example, where American brides traditionally through their bouquet of flowers to a crowd of single women, Soviet newlyweds would go to the local war memorial and lay the bouquet there in honor of the war dead. While this practice may have been more common in the Soviet era and modern Russian brides have adopted the custom of throwing the bouquet, a tour of local historical sites and placing of flowers at war memorials is still common.

Speaking of WWII memorials, AFP Reports that a German tabloid has launched a protest against a display of WWII Russian tanks in a war memorial by the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. This memorial is a holdover from the Soviet occupation of East Berlin and is dedicated to the 80,000 Soviet troops that died in the Battle of Berlin and so touches on two sensitive subjects, the former division of the country and Germany's war guilt. It is also interesting to note that Germany agreed to preserve Russian war memorial and consult Russia before making changes to them as part of the 1990 reunification treaty. If this campaign to change the memorial takes off, it may lead to some interesting diplomatic exchanges.