Now the parliament is largely split between the Popular Front (Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk;s party) and the Petro Poroshenko’s Block (as the name proclaims, President Petro Poroshenko’sparty), each of which received about 22% of the vote. Other pro-European (or at least not pro-Russian) parties include Samopomich (11 percent of the vote), Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (7 percent), and Batkivshchyna (6 percent). The only pro-Russian party to clear the 5% threshold needed to gain seats in the parliament was the aptly named Opposition Block, which received 9 percent of the vote.
Since 50% of the seats in the Rada are directly elected, there are a number of independents that got elected and there is some sorting out to be done. However, it appears that the Opposition Block will have about 112 seats out of a total of 423, or 26% of the seats. This leaves 74% of the seats in the hands of pro-European parties and makes a number of different majority coalition arrangements possible.The significance of this is, as Shevel puts it,
With several possible configurations for the majority, a substantial number of deputies, and even entire parties, can drop out of a coalition without a coalition collapsing, or with a different but still pro-western coalition forming in its place. The pro-Russian Opposition Block is virtually relegated to be what it name says: an opposition.
Shevel argues that one of the key reasons for this electoral outcome is Putin's moves in eastern Ukraine. By annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, Putiin is partially responsible for cutting 4 million voters, a large majority of whom would have voted pro-Russian, from the Ukrainian political system. His actions have also affected attitudes among the rest of Ukraine's voters, shifting public opinion away from Russian and towards European.
Shevel concludes,
If Putin’s fear after the victory of the Euromaidan uprising and the fall of Yanukovych was that Ukraine would turn decisively westward and leave Russia’s orbit, then by his actions in Crimea and the Donbas, Putin, ironically, may have helped created the very reality he wanted to avoid: Ukraine’s pro-western orientation is stronger now that every before. Russia had many levers over Ukraine that did not disappear after the fall of Yanukovych – including gas, trade, and the pro-Russian voters in the south and east of Ukraine – and Putin could have chosen to utilize these levers to prevent Ukraine from moving westward. Had Putin not annexed Crimea and sponsored separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine would certainly have had a very different parliament after these elections, with a much stronger representation by pro-Russian parties, through which Russia could have continued to exert leverage on political developments in Ukraine. As it is, Russia’s allies in the Ukrainian parliament will now likely number just over a quarter of its composition.So, is Putin an idiot? That depends on what you think he is after. If you posit that he is trying to divert Ukraine away from the west, he doesn't appear to be doing a good job of it. However, if you posit that he is pursuing domestic political and economic goals (such as solidifying support among Russian conservatives and extending state control of the economy), then you might reach a different conclusion (or at least you would have to take a different path to get to it). More on that later.
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