International Law and Institutions in the Ukraine Crisis

Crises like Russia's occupation of Ukraine are often held up as examples of the inadequacy of international law and organizations. As Eric Posner posted:

The international law commentariat has been pretty quiet about the most important geopolitical event so far this year. Hello? Anyone want to offer an opinion? Let me fill in the silence:

1. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine violates international law.

2. No one is going to do anything about it.

The four blog posts listed below address such criticisms of international law and/or institutions arising from the current situation in the Ukraine.

The Crimea, Compliance, and the Constraint of International Law by Chris Borgen: 

Borgen argues that  international law serves other purposes than to be a brick wall blocking armies from invading other nations.While enforcing compliance remains problematic, international law still play a role in "framing expectations and viable policy options" which itself puts a constraint on state action. He writes:

The language of international law can provide a vocabulary by which states and other actors may frame their arguments in an attempt to persuade other international actors. As it is a normative language, it is also provides a context against which arguments, claims, and positions may be assessed. Bargaining in the shadow of international law may make it more difficult to maintain positions that are clearly against the consensus of the international community.

And this is where Russia may find itself in a bind. If it tries to sit on a piece of Ukraine’s territory, it may find significant push-back from many states, going beyond those most directly involved in the Ukrainian crisis, because although many states may not have a geopolitical interest in the Crimea, many states do have an interest in how norms of military intervention and self-determination are interpreted.

Ukraine, International Law, and the Perfect Compliance Fallacy by Peter Spiro:

Spiro has a short post firing back at critics, like Posner, who make the claim that international law is not effective because nations are not forced to comply with it. Spiro calls this the Perfect Compliance Fallacy and he argues that it pits international law against an idealized form of domestic law that does not in fact exist. Even where substantial enforcement mechanism exist, domestic law does not achieve perfect compliance. People still commit crimes, deny that their actions are a crime, and sometimes get away with it.

Also, some areas of domestic law lack centralized enforcement mechanisms. For instance, constitutional law in the US lacks an enforcement mechanism in much the same way that international law does. In some cases, such as the Supreme Court ruling that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, Congress and the President can and do ignore rulings by the Supreme Court. The implied argument here is that constitutional law nevertheless often constrains the actions of Congress and the President.


International law and institutions look pretty weak now, but they will matter a lot down the road by Eric Voeten:

Voeten also takes a swipe at critics if international law and institutions, with a heavier emphasis on the role of institutions. He argues that:

The web of international legal rules and institutions to enforce international law is simply not strong enough to prevent Russia from intervening militarily in Ukraine. Yet, it would be a mistake to dismiss the role of international institutions in how the crisis will develop. Indeed, international institutions may well play a crucial role in containing the conflict and bringing about an eventual peace agreement.

International organizations such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Court of Human Rights will play a role in constraining Russian actions and  facilitating international responses to them.


Obama is using the OSCE to give Russia an exit strategy … if it wants one by Henry Farrell:

Farrell argues that the Obama administration is trying to use the OSCE to provide an alternative means of meeting Russia's security and human rights concerns, thus giving Putin a face saving exit strategy. Of course, it is not clear that Putin wants one, but, if he did, it would be a concrete example of an international organization mitigating the rawness of anarchy and facilitate peaceful resolution of conflict (as Neo-Liberal Institutionalists claim they can do).