Some Articles on the Crimean Crisis

You'll note that I am being optimistic in referring to this as the Crimean Crisis instead of the Ukraine Crisis. I am hopeful that Russia intervention will remain limited to the Crimean peninsula, but, while I think that this is the most likely prospect, I am by no means certain of it.

The Monkey Cage, a political science blog at the Washington Post, has been posting articles on the subject since the days right before Russia intervened. I covered a few of them earlier here and here. I also posted a little analysis of my own (along with a Ron Burgundy meme, "Well that escalated quickly!") by discussing the economic troubles in Ukraine and Charles Krauthammer's criticism of Obama over the crisis.

Next week (or later this week), I will be looking at different theoretical perspectives on the crisis for the benefit of my POL2260 students. But, for now, here are a couple more links to interesting articles at The Monkey Cage.

What is motivating Putin? by Joshua Tucker: Without arguing in favor of one interpretation over another, Tucker identifies four explanations for Vladimir Putin' motivations for intervening in Crimea that Tucker see in much of the ongoing commentary. In brief these are as follows:

1. The importance of Crimea for Russian security: This view holds that events in Ukraine threatened vital Russia security interests, primarily access to Russia's naval base in Sevastopol in a way that Putin could not ignore.
2. The “greater Russia” plan: In this view, Putin is acting to regain the loss to Russia's geopolitical position that was lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is certainly Krauhammer's view on the subject.
3. Putin’s post-2011 new domestic constituency: Others argue that Russian protests against corruption in parliamentary elections has forced Putin to embrace nationalist and religious conservatives to make up for lost support from more moderate groups in Russia. (See the next two links below)
4. The Euromaidan example as a threat to the Russian political regime: Finally, there is the view that Putin sees the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovcyh as a threat to his hold on power, in terms of it being an example that Russian opposition might follow. 

Whatever you think of any of the above motivations, I think it is useful to keep a range of alternative explanations for Putin's actions in mind to avoid becoming fixated on one in particular.

How Putin’s domestic audience explains Russia’s behavior by Boris Barkanov: I think that one of the biggest mistakes that people make when analyzing international events is to assume that a foreign leader is acting on his/her own, without worrying about domestic support. Even dictators like North Korea's Kim Jong Un have some sort of domestic constituency upon whom their power depends. In democracies, this constituency is both more obvious and difficult to please, but authoritarian leaders do have to look over there shoulder to make sure their followers are with them (and that none are about to make a move on them). Therefore, Barkanov's analysis of Putin's domestic constituency is very useful (to the point of being a must read).

In general, Barkanov sees Putin as "a strategic actor motivated by domestic concerns." He argues that portraying Putin as a dictator misrepresents that nature of Russian domestic politics which he describes as follows:

Russia is a hybrid system that combines elements of authoritarianism and pluralism.  State-sponsored repression, though now growing, has been selective and relatively limited.  Intense elite competition, elections, and public opinion are managed, but they matter more than the conventional wisdom holds.  This means a successful solution [to the crisis] has to accommodate an attentive public, as well as domestic elites’ various security, economic, and ideological interests.

Barkanov describes Putin himself as follows:

Some have suggested that Putin may be a new Hitler. A better historical analogy is to think of him as a 21st century Russian Bismarck.  My research supports former Secretary Henry Kissinger’s view that Putin is an intelligent, rational, strategic actor who views politics through a realist lens that is informed by his view of Russia’s history.  He began as a neo-liberal statist who has gradually drifted to the right for political reasons.

From this point of view, Putin's moves in Crimea have been more of a tactical response to unexpected developments in Ukraine than part of a grand strategy. However, because of the national and religious importance conservative Russian attach to the Ukraine (not to mention the economic interests that elites have in current ties to Ukraine), Barkanov does not expect Putin to back down easily.