Realist Take on the Crimean Crisis

This is the obligatory "Theories of IR" week in my World Politics course and it seems fitting, if a bit tedious, to talk about the Crimean Crisis from the theoretical perspectives of Realism and Liberalism. So this post will build on some stuff I have already posted and try to give a sense of how the Realism would explain the crisis and predict future outcomes. I'll tackle Liberalism in a later post.

To get the ball rolling, let's talk about what Realism isn't. There is a tendency for students to equate Realism with a hawkish or aggressively nationalist stance of foreign policy.  Also, because the term "liberalism" is used to describe the theoretical approach with which Realism in most often contrasted,  students sometime associate Realism with a conservative point of view (no matter how much one talks about the academic and popular usages of the term "liberal" differ). Therefore, the recent commentary by conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer might seem like the epitome of the Realist perspective on the Crimean Crisis

Krauthammer was particularly quick to come out of his corner, swinging at Putin and Obama. On Feb 27th, he analyzed Putin's actions in terms of the context of power and hegemony. In Krauthammer's view, Putin is seeking to restore a Russia mini-empire in Eurasia and his moves against Ukraine are just another step in the process of doing so. This process dates back to Russia's 2008 war with Georgia and was continued more recently with economic pressure on Ukraine to abandon plans for closer ties to Europe. As for Obama, Krauthammer blames him and other western leaders for creating a power vacuum in which Putin was free to pressure Ukraine and now may be free to invade parts of it. Therefore, Krauthammer calls on the US ad EU to counter Russian pressure (with a naval flotilla in the Black Sea) and provide economic support to the Ukraine (starting with the $15 billion dollar loan) until the Ukraine is on a firm financial footing. He concludes, "Either Ukraine will fall to Russian hegemony or finally determine its own future — if America balances Russia’s power.

Krauthammer is apparently taking an offensive realist point of view, but that this appearance may be deceiving. Sure he is talking about power and the need to balance it, but I think he is missing a couple of  key points. First, he is arguing that Putin’s goal is to restore the Soviet Empire while implying the US goal is to promote peace. Yet, realism assumes that all states have the same goals, either maximizing their security (Defensive Realism) or maximizing their relative power (Offensive Realism). Therefore, Putin's supposed goal of restoring the empire would be more properly viewed as potential strategy for balancing or maximizing relative power. While peace in Ukraine is certainly desirable, the US’ overriding interest lies in maintaining its own security or relative power position.

This may seem like a quibble, but keeping one’s eye on the power might lead one to take a different view of the situation. If one asks what changes in the distribution of power are at stake in the current situation, one might argue that Russia was faced with more potential losses of power than potential gains. Closer ties between the Ukraine and EU would represent an indirect loss, but anything that threatened Russian access to its naval base in Sevastopol would represent a much more direct (if not quite catastrophic) loss. In this context, a move to take direct control of the region around its naval base would be aimed more about avoiding a loss in power than in acquiring a gain in power. Therefore, Russia's moves are largely defensive and understandable.

Stephan Walt provides a more traditional Realist analysis of the situation that serves as a good counterpoint to Krauthammer. Walt focuses on the the issues of power and interest involved for both the US and Russia and argues that the Russia has both more vital interests at stake in Ukraine and more power in locus to pursue them than the US does. Therefore, unlike Krauthammer, he doesn't criticize the US for not having more aggressively supported Ukraine nationalists. Instead, he argues that the US and EU were naive to think that Russia would sit on its hands while the Ukrainian government sought closer ties to the West. Where Krauthammer blames Obama for not balancing Russian power to thwart Putin's imperial ambitions, Walt blames the US for not recognizing that Russian interests and proximity could not be balanced by a more distant and less interested US.

John Mearshiemer, arguably the father of Offensive Realism, sees things pretty much the same way that Walt does. By trying to get Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and into Western Europe's, and by supporting the protesters that ousted a pro-Russian Ukrainian regime, Mearshiemer argues that "Washington played a key role in precipitating this dangerous situation, and Mr. Putin’s behavior is motivated by the same geopolitical considerations that influence all great powers, including the United States."

In Mearshiemer's view, the US and NATO have continued to treat Russia as a threat since the end of the Cold War and have threatened its security by expanding NATO and planning to build missile defense systems in Europe. In this context, a pro-Western government in Kiev was a threat to Russian interests that Putin could not ignore. In a textbook perfect expression of the Realist view of the effect of anarchy pn state behavior, Mearshiemer explains:

Mr. Putin’s view is understandable. Because there is no world government to protect states from one another, major powers are acutely sensitive to threats — especially near their borders — and they sometimes act ruthlessly to address potential dangers. International law and human rights concerns take a back seat when vital security issues are at stake.

But, as I like to point out, anarchy in the international system and the supremacy of security concerns are assumptions in Realist theory, meaning they do not vary from situation to situation. Since the actions of states (or their leaders) do vary, you have to look at relative power to predict what a state will or won't do.

With regard to power, Mearsheimer notes (indeed laments) that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union broke up, which left it without a credible deterrent to Russian conventional military superiority. Russia also has a good deal of political and economic leverage vis-a-vis the US and EU. With security at stake and some good cards to play, Mearshiemer thinks that it was not only understandable that Putin acted as he did, but it is also unlikely that he will fold under pressure from Western sanctions.

So, rather than being hawkish like Krauthammer, Mearsheimer argues that Obama should seek to recognize Russian interests while supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity. In his words:

To achieve those goals, the United States should emphasize that Georgia and Ukraine will not become NATO members. It should make clear that America will not interfere in future Ukrainian elections or be sympathetic to a virulently anti-Russian government in Kiev. And it should demand that future Ukrainian governments respect minority rights, especially regarding the status of Russian as an official language. In short, Ukraine should remain neutral between East and West.

Some might say these policy prescriptions amount to a defeat for America. On the contrary, Washington has a deep-seated interest in ending this conflict and maintaining Ukraine as a sovereign buffer state between Russia and NATO. Furthermore, good relations with Russia are essential, because the United States needs Moscow’s help to deal with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and eventually to help counter China, the only genuine potential rival to the United States.