Liberal Interpretations of the Crimean Crisis

Whenever you try to apply Liberal theories to a case in which one nation uses force on another, the Liberal perspective appears to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Realism since force has in fact already been used. For instance, Mearsheimer's analysis of Russian actions and the underlying assumption that only power can deter power seems quite plausible at the moment.

However, one must remember that, in 1990, Mearsheimer predicted that the end of the Cold War could lead to a multi-polar  and more war prone international system in Europe.  He has more recently argued that Europe has remained peaceful because the United States has acted as the pacifier of Europe by maintaining large forces in the region since the end of the Cold War. In this view, the fact that European nations are all democracies, that they have become more economically interdependent, or that they have established a fairy strong  international institution in the EU are of minor importance.

But now that we have something that looks like an old fashioned territory grab that is the bread and butter of Realism, what do Liberal theories have to say about this? Unfortunately, Liberalism is a term that covers a wide array of different theories and perspectives, or what I call flavors of Liberalism. Furthermore, none of these theories, or at least none of the Neo-Liberal theories commonly used in academia, entirely discount the importance of security and power, or replace Realism's model of the world with entirely different one. In general, they argue that Realism is missing some important aspects of the international system and state behavior by focusing entirely on power, security, and the international system.

Republican Liberalism: The general point of view here is that a nation's domestic politics has an impact on its international behavior. Democratic Peace Theory is perhaps the most important part of this perspective and it predicts that democratic nations will not fight wars with other democratic nations. Therefore, one might suppose that, since the fall of the Communist system, Russia would be less likely to get into a war with democratic nations.

However, this presumes that Russia is currently a democracy. After all, Putin is a democratically elected president. But it takes more than an election to make a democracy (note that even North Korea stages elections). The folks at Freedom House provide an an index of democracy that rates the political systems of the world according to their level of civil and political rights. On a scale of 1 (best) to 7 (worst), Russia gets a 5.5, which Freedom categorizes as Not Free. In contrast, Ukraine gets a 3.5, or Partly Free, rating and most Western European nations get a 1, or Free rating. (Freedom House also has a world map that shows the category of all nations in the world).

So, Russia's actions can be seen as the result of a lack of democracy in the nation. Indeed, Freedom House is doing an "I-told-you-so" on the subject:

Since 2003, Freedom House has documented the country’s move to authoritarian rule and warned of Russian efforts to restore hegemony over Ukraine (see attached and below a selection of quotes from past Freedom House analysis on Russia).  We explained how this increasingly authoritarian system posed a threat to democracy not just inside Russia itself but through Vladimir Putin’s support for dictators and pressure on democratic governments among Russia’s neighbors.  Blocking democratic development and integration with the West along Russia’s periphery is integral to Putin’s repressive rule.  The nature of the Russian regime—kleptocratic authoritarianism—lies at the core of the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine.

Beyond Democratic Peace, Republican Liberalism can be thought to encompass more specific analyses of domestic political influences on foreign policy. One example of this would be Boris Barkanov's argument that Putin is playing to nationalist and religious audiences in Russia. In general, Barkanov sees Putin as "a strategic actor motivated by domestic concerns." He argues that portraying Putin as a dictator misrepresents that nature of Russian domestic politics which he describes as follows:

Russia is a hybrid system that combines elements of authoritarianism and pluralism.  State-sponsored repression, though now growing, has been selective and relatively limited.  Intense elite competition, elections, and public opinion are managed, but they matter more than the conventional wisdom holds.  This means a successful solution [to the crisis] has to accommodate an attentive public, as well as domestic elites’ various security, economic, and ideological interests.

Barkanov describes Putin himself as follows:

Some have suggested that Putin may be a new Hitler. A better historical analogy is to think of him as a 21st century Russian Bismarck.  My research supports former Secretary Henry Kissinger’s view that Putin is an intelligent, rational, strategic actor who views politics through a realist lens that is informed by his view of Russia’s history.  He began as a neo-liberal statist who has gradually drifted to the right for political reasons.
From this point of view, Putin's moves in Crimea have been more of a tactical response to unexpected developments in Ukraine than part of a grand strategy. However, because of the national and religious importance conservative Russian attach to the Ukraine (not to mention the economic interests that elites have in current ties to Ukraine), Barkanov does not expect Putin to back down easily.

Another concept that loosely fits in this category is the diversionary war hypothesis, This posits that leaders may use small scale wars as a means of diverting public attention from domestic difficulties. This idea was popularized in the film "Wag the Dog" which takes its name from the idea of the tail wagging the dog.  In a post on the Monkey Cage, Kimberly Marten discusses the role that Putin's intervention might play in diverting public attention away from the corruption and waste in the Sochi Olympics. Though Marten does not argue that this provided the primary motivation for Putin's moves, she notes that the Crimean Crisis was well timed since critics of the Sochi Olympics had been holding off until after the games were over. While domestic political diversion has seemed at play in wars like the Falklands War, the wag the dog meme too often threatens to become conspiracy theory.

Economic or Commercial Liberalism: From this point of view, economic ties between nations are supposed to make them less likely to go to war with one another. More specifically, when nations become economically interdependent on one another, the costs of going to war are thought to be so high that the nations will seek other means of resolving their differences.

Russia and the EU are arguably in a situation of interdependence. According to the BBC, the EU is Russia's largest trading partner by a wide margin with 267 billion Euros in trade with Russia. Russia's next largest trading partner is China with only 64 billion Euros in trade. Europe also buys 84% of Russian oil exports and 76% of its natural gas exports (most of which flow through Ukraine). Of course, Europe needs these imports of fuel to keep itself going, thus both sides are dependent on one another to a good extent.

As for Ukraine and Russia, the relationship is a little more lopsided. Trade between the two countries amounts to about 24 billion Euros per year, only 1/10th as much as Russian trade with Europe. Much of that trade was natural gas, which Russia was selling to Ukraine at a greatly reduced price to encourage stronger ties (and discourage a move towards the EU). As a result of Ukraine's change on government, Russia is now demanding a higher price for gas and a refund of the gas discount (to the tune of $12 billion). So, in some ways, Russia's economic position vis-a-vis Ukraine is improving as a result of the crisis, especially if Russia expected that a Ukrainian move towards the EU was going to diminish the economic benefits of friendly relations with Ukraine anyway.

Of course,  many of Russia pipelines run through Ukraine,and the Ukrainians could threaten to shut them down. However, that would cause a great deal of harm to the Ukrainian and European economies and could provide a pretext for a Russian invasion. Alternatively, a large Russian invasion of Ukraine might either force the Ukrainians's hands or simply disrupt the pipelines as collateral damage. This creates a rather precarious situation.

In metaphorical terms, I would describe the situation this way. Imagine there is a big puddle of gasoline. Russia and the EU each have one foot stuck in the edge of it and Ukraine is standing in the middle. All three have lighters which they can use to ignite the gas and burn all three of them.

In such a situation, no one will want to make any sudden big moves that might cause one of the others to light the gasoline on fire. However, because anyone who lights the fire will also get burned, they will be reluctant to do so. As a result, each party can probably get away with a lot of subtle little moves without triggering someone else to spark a conflagration. That is to say, having a lighter doesn't give anyone control over anyone else, but no one will be able to ignore the fact that the other two have lighters. Therefore, everyone will be constrained in what they do and "go small, or go home" will be the order of the day.

In terms of the Crimea, Russian actions have been relatively constrained (at least up to this point). Since they started out with a major military base there, Russia did not invade the peninsula so much as come out of the barracks to occupy it. Even then, they weren't willing to own up to the fact that it was their own forces taking over the territory. While labeling their forces "Crimean self-defense units" was a transparent fiction, it bespoke a certain level of sensitivity and a perceived need to be circumspect. Also, the fact that the Crimean parliament actually kicked off event by declaring independence from Kiev probably presented Putin with an opportunity to secure the peninsula in a way that would not provoke a massive response from Ukraine and the EU.

In this sense, Russia is "going small" and their economic interdependence with the EU and, to lesser extent, with Ukraine may keep their actions small (compared to what they might otherwise be) even if it doesn't make them go home.

Institutional or Regulatory Liberalism: This is the view that having international rules and institutions can mitigate the raw effects of anarchy and allow more cooperation between nations. Realists may scoff at this notion and quip that institutions and rules didn't stop Hitler, but I think that such arguments make a straw man out of institutional liberalism by overstating the expectations of what institutions can accomplish. To my mind, the First Gulf War in 1990-1991 is a good case to examine. Saddam Hussein blatantly violated the rules of the UN Charter when he invaded Kuwait. While the rules didn't stop him from doing so, they greatly facilitated a UN based response and a broad coalition to oust him from Kuwait. Also, prior to the invasion,  the US did not have a formal treaty with Kuwait that committed the US to defend Kuwait (something that famously came up in his interview with the US ambassador to Iraq a couple days before he invaded). One is left to wonder what effect a defense pact with Kuwait would have had on Saddam's calculations of the US response to his planned invasion.

As far as Crimea is concerned, I have already blogged on varying views on the role of international law and institutions and will let that post finish this one off.