White House Strategy for Victory

As you may have heard, President Bush has put out "Our National Strategy for Victory", or more precisely, an outline of one. Obviously, this will be the topic of several posts here . Before I get going, you might want to read it in its entirety at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html

When reading the outline, one is immediately struck by the rhetorical qualities of the document. The opening heading of the executive summary is "OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ:Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State" This is a sterling example of "bottom line up front" writing or, as a cycnic might label it, "main talking point up front". As a political communication, the outline appears, on first reading, to be first rate.

However, there is as much meat as spin in the outline and so we have a lot of things to chew on. The document lays out a definition of success, a definition of the enemy and a three pronged strategy (Political, Military, and Economic) for achieving success. Most importently, it lists the assumptions upon which the strategy is based. All of this is great grist for the intellectual mill.

But leavinf that aside for the moment, there are a couple points to make (or carp on). The first is the document's assertion that "No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one." I find this interesting in light of the fact that, among scholars of military strategy, the US is considered to be more prone then most to pursue planned strategies with timetables. A good example would be the Second World War in which the US constantly agitated for a planned strategy in Europe (as opposed to the UK's desire for a more opportunistic strategy) and actually set a firm deadline for victory against Japan (i.e., one year after Germany's surrender). However, these same scholars usually portrayed the American prediliction for timetables as something of a weakness, so we should keep an open mind on this.

Another phrase in the document that raises an eyebrow is this one: "It is not realistic to expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally removed from power. " What strikes me about this passage is that it is exactly the sort of thing that someone like Lawrence Eagleberger might have said when cautioning against the war before it began. At this point, it reads as a sad self-indictment of postwar planning, or the lack of it. But that horse left the barn three years ago. [While I'm closing doors on an empty barn, the document's description of what will happen if we "fail" (i.e., "Iraq would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies") gives lie to the asertion that the US is safer from terrorists now then it was before the war. ]

With these quibbles aside, the thing that strikes me most is that this strategy is being enunciated about 18 months too late. On first reading, the strategy might have made the US position more clear to the world, and would have made it easier to enlist foreign support for at least the political and economic components. Furthermore, though it rejects rigid timetables, the document provides the most explicit official discussion to date of the conditions under which the US will leave Iraq. This is something that would have been useful for maintaining support for the occupation in the US, Iraq, and overseas.

Of course there are a myriad of reasons why it wasn't produced earlier. The situation on the ground wasn't as clear 18 months ago and US public support for the war was high enough that the "Stay the course" rhetoric was sufficient and more politic. And, of course there was the looming election that would have subjected such a document to charges of partisanship. All of this adds up to the banal conclusion that war and politics are tricky things.

Reading Al-Zawahiri

A couple of months ago, the Director of National Intelligence posted the text of a letter from Al-Zawahiri to Al-Zargawi. The original letter is 13 pages long and full of many tangential comments and religious exhortations. I was able to edit it down to two pages so that my students and I could discuss it in class.

Of course, such drastic editing can change the entire meaning, but I felt I got the essence of the text. I have cut and pasted my edited excerpts below. You can see the entire original at http://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf.

Excerpts from Al-Zawarhiri’s Letter

It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq; however, the center would be in the Levant and Egypt.

It is strange that the Arab nationalists also have, despite their avoidance of Islamic practice, come to comprehend the great importance of this province. It is like a bird whose wings are Egypt and Syria, and whose heart is Palestine. They have come to comprehend the goal of planting Israel in this region, and they are not misled in this, rather they have admitted their ignorance of the religious nature of this conflict.

If our intended goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet and if we expect to establish its state predominantly-according to how it appears to us-in the heart of the Islamic world, then your efforts and sacrifices-God permitting-are a large step directly towards that goal.

So we must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain it, and it is my humble opinion that the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals:

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity

My raising this idea-I don't claim that it's infallible-is only to stress something extremely important. And it is that the mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding sway over us. Instead, their ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to the one after it until the Hour of Resurrection.

If we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic amirate in Iraq, or a caliphate if possible, then, we will see that the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy - after the help and granting of success by God - is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries.

(1) If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate rulers and their removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow….

(2) In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison dungeons far from the public and the light of day. This is precisely what the secular, apostate forces that are controlling our countries are striving for…

(3) The Muslim masses-for many reasons, and this is not the place to discuss it-do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.

(4) Therefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve, if there is no contravention of Sharia in such avoidance, and as long as there are other options to resort to, meaning we must not throw the masses-scant in knowledge-into the sea before we teach them to swim…

Among the practical applications of this viewpoint in your blessed arena:

(A) The matter of preparing for the aftermath of the exit of the Americans: The Americans will exit soon, God willing, and the establishment of a governing authority-as soon as the country is freed from the Americans-does not depend on force alone. Indeed, it's imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance and in the Shura council and in promulgating what is allowed and what is not allowed.

B(2) Striving for the unity of the mujahedeen:

C(3) Striving for the ulema: …. The ulema among the general public are, as well, the symbol of Islam and its emblem. Their disparagement may lead to the general public deeming religion and its adherents as being unimportant. This is a greater injury than the benefit of criticizing a theologian on a heresy or an issue.

D(4) The position on the Shia: … For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.


E(5) Scenes of slaughter: Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable - also- are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.

Welcome to the New Blog

I have wanted to start a blog to get a general discussion of International Relations going with my students for a couple of months now. The big stumbling block was coming up with a name. Of course, I didn't really overcome that obcstacle, I just decided to go around it with "IRBlog".

Now the challenge is to come up with pithy and insightful comments about International Relations. Let's hope I have better luck there.