Bush's New Plan?

The Weekly Standard reports that Bush's new strategy is based on the work of retired General Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. The report, entitled "Choosing Victory: A plan for Success in Iraq" is available at the institute's website at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25292/pub_detail.asp

I will comment on this in a separate post. For now, here is the Frederick Kagan's summary of his plan:

"We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.

We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.

These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.

After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and Marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.

As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.

This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:

The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.

Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy.

Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.

The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects.

The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.

The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age. "

Iraq Study What?

So a week and two rounds of Sunday talk shows have passed, and the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report has been pummeled worse than Fallujah. While everyone seems to agree with its grim assessment of the situation in Iraq, when it comes to the ISG's recommendations, it appears that everyone has found something to hate.

This has been an early Christmas present for the White Houseas it has shifted media focus from the administration's short comings to those of the ISG. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer has virtually crowed about this being a new opportunity for the president to announce a "bold new strategy". Krauthammer never quite explains what this bold new strategy might be in what appears to be a hope based analysis on his part.

The administration, for its part, has chosen to delay announcing its new strategy until the new Secretary of Defense has been sworn in and gets a chance to travel to Iraq. But supposedly, a decision has been made by the decider in chief. So what's the point of the delay?

I think that the answer is that there is no bold new strategy, just a number of changes in policy more moderate than those proposed by the ISG. It appears that the administration will opt for the Pentagon's middle-of-the-road "Go Long" strategy while applying additional pressure on the Iraqi government to reform. It is doubtful we will see the kind of unfettered diplomacy called for by the ISG or any timetables as called for by the Democrats.

This delay is actually politically shrewd on the administration's part. The ISG report showed is that there is no "bold new strategy" waiting in the wings and that the audience is filled with hecklers. Indeed, to strain the metaphor, the hecklers now seem to be supplied with rotten tomatoes in that the November elections and ISG report have given bi-partisan credibility to criticism of the administration. I can't imagine any strategy that wouldn't ignite a firestorm of criticism once announced.

In another way, time might temporarily be on Bush's side. At this time of year, public attention will shift from Iraq to the holidays, giving some domestic breathing room until the new year. Though it is not a long time, it may be that something will give in Iraqi politics, such as the Shiites ousting Al-Sadr's party from the governing coalition. While such a move wouldn't solve the problem, it would give credibility to a moderate policy change.

I say policy change because the strategy would be the same, i.e., to support the Iraqi government until it can stand on its own. I expect the administration will stick with this strategy while adjusting the tactics it uses. I would expect to see redployments of US combat forces in Iraq, increases in the number of advisors, increases in funding for the Iraqi Army, and general increases in the US Army and Marine Corps. In other words, the changes already under way, along with increased talk about 'benchmarks', will be the 'new' way forward. It's success will depend on what the Iraqis do more than on what the US does and we are left mainly to hope that Iraqi politics will move in the right direction.

The Morning After the Iraq Study Group Report

Actually, it is several mornings after the Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report, but it is the first Sunday morning. In an hour or so the weekly gatherings of TV talking heads will start and we will begin to see the administration's considered spin on the report, as well as the media's.

The last few days has seen the spin move from the report's comprehensive indictment of the administration's Iraq policy to the weaknesses of the group's recommendations. With John McCain and Anthony Zini calling for a more aggressive militray approach, and the Iraqi president rejecting the report out of hand, the ISG's report may be on the defensive more than the administration.

If this is the case, then the adminstration will find it much easier to cherry pick the report (exactly what the ISG sad it shouldn't do). I have heard that the president is planning on giving another speech in a week or so to lay out his new "way forward". This sets off warning bells with me as I consider the administration's defining (if not fatal) flaw to be a belief that it can solve policy problems with speeches rather than actions.

In any case, now is a sort of wait and see period. We need to watch Iraqi domestic politics for either a shift in power or a soldification of Al-Maliki's base. We need to watch regional diplomacy to see if Iraq's call for a conference is heeded. We need to watch American politics to see if Bush makes any real change.

Two additional points: First, I found it interesting (as in I should have seen it coming) that it was the Iraqi's who called for the regional conference. This makes sense from the sovereignty point of view as only the Iraqi government can legally invite others to help in Iraq. However, it is not clear that a Shiite dominated Iraqi government will get Sunni states to the table. It is becoming clear that, as worried about civil strife as they are, the Sunni states are just as worried about Iran expanding its influence in the region. This will complicate the regional diplomatic process as much as will US reluctance to deal with Iran and Syria.

Second, the "Kremlin watching" of the adminstration will be more interesting than ever. With Rumsfeld gone, who will call the shots and to whom can we look for a bold change of policy. Cheney is ever the Iraq hawk and has rumbled about nullifying any attempts by Congress to influence policy. Rice is the administration's star but has been keeping a low profile as the ISG report implicitly ravages her foreign policy. She lacks Baker's realism and thus his zeal for carrying ouot a Diplomatic Offensive in which she must deal with "enemies" such as Syria and Iran. And then there is Gates, the one most prone to change, but in control of the military in a situation that is widely acknowledged to lack a military solution.

Could Bush himself (with his White House aides such as Hadley) drive the policy? It would be uncharacteristically like his father for him to do so. True, he has compromised in the past when faced with overwhelming domestic opposition(e.g., establishing the 9-11 Commission). But can a president whose cabinet meetings Paul O'Neil likened to a "blind man in a room of deaf mutes", assert his control and deftly maneuver the government down an uncertain and ill defined path. Can he gain cooperation of the many states his policies and rhetoric have done so much to alienate. If he could, it would put him in league with FDR and Lincoln just as the historical debate is gravitating towards whether he is as bad as Buchanon (long held to be the worst president in history).

As I say, it will be interesting to see if the adminstration tries to get out in front of the demands for policy change by shifting responsibility to the Iraqis, declaring victory and getting 'out of dodge'. Or, will it try to dress up it's stay until victory policy and spin its way through the next couple of years. The rhetoric to date favors the latter, but then the rhetoric of late has been less reliable. As I say, I will be waiting to see.