Actually, it is several mornings after the Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report, but it is the first Sunday morning. In an hour or so the weekly gatherings of TV talking heads will start and we will begin to see the administration's considered spin on the report, as well as the media's.
The last few days has seen the spin move from the report's comprehensive indictment of the administration's Iraq policy to the weaknesses of the group's recommendations. With John McCain and Anthony Zini calling for a more aggressive militray approach, and the Iraqi president rejecting the report out of hand, the ISG's report may be on the defensive more than the administration.
If this is the case, then the adminstration will find it much easier to cherry pick the report (exactly what the ISG sad it shouldn't do). I have heard that the president is planning on giving another speech in a week or so to lay out his new "way forward". This sets off warning bells with me as I consider the administration's defining (if not fatal) flaw to be a belief that it can solve policy problems with speeches rather than actions.
In any case, now is a sort of wait and see period. We need to watch Iraqi domestic politics for either a shift in power or a soldification of Al-Maliki's base. We need to watch regional diplomacy to see if Iraq's call for a conference is heeded. We need to watch American politics to see if Bush makes any real change.
Two additional points: First, I found it interesting (as in I should have seen it coming) that it was the Iraqi's who called for the regional conference. This makes sense from the sovereignty point of view as only the Iraqi government can legally invite others to help in Iraq. However, it is not clear that a Shiite dominated Iraqi government will get Sunni states to the table. It is becoming clear that, as worried about civil strife as they are, the Sunni states are just as worried about Iran expanding its influence in the region. This will complicate the regional diplomatic process as much as will US reluctance to deal with Iran and Syria.
Second, the "Kremlin watching" of the adminstration will be more interesting than ever. With Rumsfeld gone, who will call the shots and to whom can we look for a bold change of policy. Cheney is ever the Iraq hawk and has rumbled about nullifying any attempts by Congress to influence policy. Rice is the administration's star but has been keeping a low profile as the ISG report implicitly ravages her foreign policy. She lacks Baker's realism and thus his zeal for carrying ouot a Diplomatic Offensive in which she must deal with "enemies" such as Syria and Iran. And then there is Gates, the one most prone to change, but in control of the military in a situation that is widely acknowledged to lack a military solution.
Could Bush himself (with his White House aides such as Hadley) drive the policy? It would be uncharacteristically like his father for him to do so. True, he has compromised in the past when faced with overwhelming domestic opposition(e.g., establishing the 9-11 Commission). But can a president whose cabinet meetings Paul O'Neil likened to a "blind man in a room of deaf mutes", assert his control and deftly maneuver the government down an uncertain and ill defined path. Can he gain cooperation of the many states his policies and rhetoric have done so much to alienate. If he could, it would put him in league with FDR and Lincoln just as the historical debate is gravitating towards whether he is as bad as Buchanon (long held to be the worst president in history).
As I say, it will be interesting to see if the adminstration tries to get out in front of the demands for policy change by shifting responsibility to the Iraqis, declaring victory and getting 'out of dodge'. Or, will it try to dress up it's stay until victory policy and spin its way through the next couple of years. The rhetoric to date favors the latter, but then the rhetoric of late has been less reliable. As I say, I will be waiting to see.
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