Bush's New Plan?

The Weekly Standard reports that Bush's new strategy is based on the work of retired General Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. The report, entitled "Choosing Victory: A plan for Success in Iraq" is available at the institute's website at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25292/pub_detail.asp

I will comment on this in a separate post. For now, here is the Frederick Kagan's summary of his plan:

"We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.

We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.

These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.

After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and Marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.

As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.

This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:

The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.

Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy.

Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.

The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects.

The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.

The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age. "

Iraq Study What?

So a week and two rounds of Sunday talk shows have passed, and the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report has been pummeled worse than Fallujah. While everyone seems to agree with its grim assessment of the situation in Iraq, when it comes to the ISG's recommendations, it appears that everyone has found something to hate.

This has been an early Christmas present for the White Houseas it has shifted media focus from the administration's short comings to those of the ISG. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer has virtually crowed about this being a new opportunity for the president to announce a "bold new strategy". Krauthammer never quite explains what this bold new strategy might be in what appears to be a hope based analysis on his part.

The administration, for its part, has chosen to delay announcing its new strategy until the new Secretary of Defense has been sworn in and gets a chance to travel to Iraq. But supposedly, a decision has been made by the decider in chief. So what's the point of the delay?

I think that the answer is that there is no bold new strategy, just a number of changes in policy more moderate than those proposed by the ISG. It appears that the administration will opt for the Pentagon's middle-of-the-road "Go Long" strategy while applying additional pressure on the Iraqi government to reform. It is doubtful we will see the kind of unfettered diplomacy called for by the ISG or any timetables as called for by the Democrats.

This delay is actually politically shrewd on the administration's part. The ISG report showed is that there is no "bold new strategy" waiting in the wings and that the audience is filled with hecklers. Indeed, to strain the metaphor, the hecklers now seem to be supplied with rotten tomatoes in that the November elections and ISG report have given bi-partisan credibility to criticism of the administration. I can't imagine any strategy that wouldn't ignite a firestorm of criticism once announced.

In another way, time might temporarily be on Bush's side. At this time of year, public attention will shift from Iraq to the holidays, giving some domestic breathing room until the new year. Though it is not a long time, it may be that something will give in Iraqi politics, such as the Shiites ousting Al-Sadr's party from the governing coalition. While such a move wouldn't solve the problem, it would give credibility to a moderate policy change.

I say policy change because the strategy would be the same, i.e., to support the Iraqi government until it can stand on its own. I expect the administration will stick with this strategy while adjusting the tactics it uses. I would expect to see redployments of US combat forces in Iraq, increases in the number of advisors, increases in funding for the Iraqi Army, and general increases in the US Army and Marine Corps. In other words, the changes already under way, along with increased talk about 'benchmarks', will be the 'new' way forward. It's success will depend on what the Iraqis do more than on what the US does and we are left mainly to hope that Iraqi politics will move in the right direction.

The Morning After the Iraq Study Group Report

Actually, it is several mornings after the Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report, but it is the first Sunday morning. In an hour or so the weekly gatherings of TV talking heads will start and we will begin to see the administration's considered spin on the report, as well as the media's.

The last few days has seen the spin move from the report's comprehensive indictment of the administration's Iraq policy to the weaknesses of the group's recommendations. With John McCain and Anthony Zini calling for a more aggressive militray approach, and the Iraqi president rejecting the report out of hand, the ISG's report may be on the defensive more than the administration.

If this is the case, then the adminstration will find it much easier to cherry pick the report (exactly what the ISG sad it shouldn't do). I have heard that the president is planning on giving another speech in a week or so to lay out his new "way forward". This sets off warning bells with me as I consider the administration's defining (if not fatal) flaw to be a belief that it can solve policy problems with speeches rather than actions.

In any case, now is a sort of wait and see period. We need to watch Iraqi domestic politics for either a shift in power or a soldification of Al-Maliki's base. We need to watch regional diplomacy to see if Iraq's call for a conference is heeded. We need to watch American politics to see if Bush makes any real change.

Two additional points: First, I found it interesting (as in I should have seen it coming) that it was the Iraqi's who called for the regional conference. This makes sense from the sovereignty point of view as only the Iraqi government can legally invite others to help in Iraq. However, it is not clear that a Shiite dominated Iraqi government will get Sunni states to the table. It is becoming clear that, as worried about civil strife as they are, the Sunni states are just as worried about Iran expanding its influence in the region. This will complicate the regional diplomatic process as much as will US reluctance to deal with Iran and Syria.

Second, the "Kremlin watching" of the adminstration will be more interesting than ever. With Rumsfeld gone, who will call the shots and to whom can we look for a bold change of policy. Cheney is ever the Iraq hawk and has rumbled about nullifying any attempts by Congress to influence policy. Rice is the administration's star but has been keeping a low profile as the ISG report implicitly ravages her foreign policy. She lacks Baker's realism and thus his zeal for carrying ouot a Diplomatic Offensive in which she must deal with "enemies" such as Syria and Iran. And then there is Gates, the one most prone to change, but in control of the military in a situation that is widely acknowledged to lack a military solution.

Could Bush himself (with his White House aides such as Hadley) drive the policy? It would be uncharacteristically like his father for him to do so. True, he has compromised in the past when faced with overwhelming domestic opposition(e.g., establishing the 9-11 Commission). But can a president whose cabinet meetings Paul O'Neil likened to a "blind man in a room of deaf mutes", assert his control and deftly maneuver the government down an uncertain and ill defined path. Can he gain cooperation of the many states his policies and rhetoric have done so much to alienate. If he could, it would put him in league with FDR and Lincoln just as the historical debate is gravitating towards whether he is as bad as Buchanon (long held to be the worst president in history).

As I say, it will be interesting to see if the adminstration tries to get out in front of the demands for policy change by shifting responsibility to the Iraqis, declaring victory and getting 'out of dodge'. Or, will it try to dress up it's stay until victory policy and spin its way through the next couple of years. The rhetoric to date favors the latter, but then the rhetoric of late has been less reliable. As I say, I will be waiting to see.

Emerging Diplomacy on Iraq

It looks as if the White House has finally put diplomacy on the front burner. When I earlier wrote that diplomacy was critically needed, I wasn't sure the administration would move in that direction. In many ways, the recent diplomatic activity is more reassuring than Rumsfeld's replacement. However, it is not yet clear how the diplomacy will play out, especially with regard to three questions:

1. Will the regional powers engage in a process and commit resources in Iraq?
2. Will the US do what is necessary to gain cooperation?
3. What will the US' role be in this process?

First, while Bush's visit to the NATO conference at Riga and then to Jordan is getting the most attention, Cheney's visit to Saudi Arabia is possibly more significant. The Saudi royal family is almost as close to the Bush family as James Baker and they have a huge stake in the region's stability. They also undoubtedly share the administration's concern about Iran's growing influence in the region. If there is to be a regional conference on Iraq, a regional power will probably have to promote it. I have been very curious to see who does so and it may be that the Saudis will be the ones.

Second, while Bush is certainly working the diplomatic front, he is still maintaining the no compromise rhetoric. If you look closely, most of the talk about redeployments, Iran & Syria involvement, and conferences comes from outside the administration. This is probably the White House's preliminary bargaining strategy or at least an attempt to avoid "negotiating with itself". However, Bush has often said that we need to listen to what he says to understand what he is going to do. So there is a seed of doubt in my mind as to whether he will make the compromises that an effective diplomatic process will require.

Of course, with the handling of Rumsfeld's resignation, Bush put the lie to his own advice about listening to what he says. Indeed, the flip side of my concern that he won't compromise is a that he will have to renege on most of what he is saying. If, as was the case with Rumsfeld's resignation, the White House fully intends to do what they are emphatically saying they won't do, then it may lose what little credibility it has left.

This is not to damn Bush if he does and damn him if he doesn't. Rather I mean to damn him if he doesn't make the compromisesthat diplomacy requires, or to damn him for not using the noncommittal language that diplomacy also requires. To me this appears as another case in which the political and communication strategies that put Bush in office, and at which the administration truly excels, are inappropriate for the pursuit of foreign policy. It is going to be difficult for the administration to cooperate with a nation it has declared part of the "Axis of Evil".

Finally, if a diplomatic initiative gets under way, it is not clear that the US will, or should, be in the driver's seat. If there is to be a regional conference, it would be a good thing if it were proposed by a regional power, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt. However, to be effective, a conference will need the participation of all Iraq's neighbors to include Iran and Syria. Just agreeing to a conference with Iran and Syria would require a reversal of policy for the White House and participation will expose the US to criticism of its occupation and demands for withdrawal. Furthermore, there will be the inevitable pressure to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the traditional poison pill for US involvement in Mid East conferences.

It will be interesting to see not only if such a conference can take place, but also how much the US and regional powers are willing to compromise on the above issues. If the regional powers agree to participate without Syria or Iran, or if they agree to avoid issues that embarrass the US, then it will signal an extraordinary interest in resolving the conflict in Iraq. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if a separate regional effort develops to side step the above mentioned obstacles. Indeed, there is the possibility of regional negotiations leaving the US behind if the administration does not get out in front on the diplomacy. Such unity of effort would be a first for the region and so the possibility is more intriguing than likely. Even so, there is so much at stake here in terms of Shia-Sunni relations, opposing Al-Qaida, and balancing Iranian influence, that extraordinary steps may be taken.

Sea Change on Iraq

What a difference and election makes. Not only did we get Democratic congress, a kinder gentler President, and a new Secretary of Defense, but we also got a major shift in punditry. Charles Krauthammer has shifted from "stay the course/blame the Democrats" to "Accept the inevitable/Blame the Iraqis." More importantly, Henry Kissinger, the major proponent of victory as an exit strategy, now says that military victory is impossible is now calling for an international conference on Iraq.

More importantly, there is activity on the international front. Serious foreign minister has visited Iraq and called for the US to set up a timetable for withdrawal. Following meetings between the Iraq Study Group and Syria Ambassador, this would seem to indicate that Syria is willing to get involved in international efforts such as those suggested by Kissinger (and, dare I say, myself).

The question is how the administration will respond. To be sure, the fact that we are questioning "how" they will respond instead of "if" they will respond is a significant breakthrough. The problem is that we are long past the point where tweaking the strategy or the policy making team will work. Indeed, we are probably past the point where bold innovation on our part alone will work. What we now need is bold efforts all around the cabinet table and around the region. An increased willingness to change and accept compromise on the administration's part is not enough in a situation that calls for bold leadership and aggressive diplomacy.

The point here is that the success or failure the US withdrawal from Iraq is more in the hands of Condalezza Rice than the new guy at the Pentagon. Hopefully, Rumsfeld's resignation will lead the way to more political and diplomatic efforts than military ones. It will be interesting to see what Condi does following the President's trip to Asia. Unfortunately, between North Korea, Iranian nuclear talks, and the traditional Israeli/Palestinian issues, there is a lot in the State Department's inbox. We might need a special envoy, such as Baker, get things done on the diplomatic front.

Meanwhile, back at the Pentagon, the military is reportedly developing options. They are supposedly looking at three options: "Go Big", "Go Long", and "Go Home". Typically, the bold options of "Go Big" and "Go Home" are being rejected out of hand and thus the "Go Long" option is really the only one they are serious about implementing. This option would increase US troops in the short run shift the US into more of a training and advisory role. In other words, committing more effort to the the concept that we have been pursuing for the last couple years.

I find it interesting that the "Go Long" description is being used for this option as going long in football implies taking a bold chance to achieve a touchdown. The plan under consideration bears no resemblance to this. The key to the Pentagon's plan is placing US advisors in Iraqi units as was done in the Vietnam war. Over the last year, several tactical units have been gutted to send their officers and NCO through formal training at Fort Riley to become advisors as part of the Iraq Assistance Group. It is hoped that having advisors in Iraqi units will stiffen up the Iraqi security forces better than having them work with separate American units as we have been doping. So in the end, the "Go Long" plan is more akin to recognizing that we shouldn't have been trying to run the ball with our defensive line and calling time out to bring the offense on the field to run the last play over again.

Elections, Polls, and My Bloodpressure

I am an IR professor and this is an IR blog, but now and then, domestic politics screams out for attention. At election time it screams loudest, and what it screams is usually so at odds with what I know about the world that my blood pressure goes up. So, if only to help lower my BP, here are a few comments on this year's elections.

American Electoral System: We must always keep in mind that the nature of elections is largely driven by the design of the electoral system. In the US, we have single member districts with plurality voting, the so called "first past the post" system. This type of system (wherever it is used) results in two dominant parties which compete for the centrist voters. Therefore, their policy positions tend to converge and, since their is little policy differentiation, there is a dominant focus on personality politics. These systems are known for producing stable majoritarian policy, but also for alientaing many citizens and producing low voter turnout.

This is in contrast to proportional representation systems which feature multiple parties taking distinct policy stands across the political spectrum. Politics in these systems is very issue oriented and the personal charcateristics of elected officials are relatively unimportant. Becuase there is usually a party for every major political persuasion, citizens are more engaged in the system and greater numbers turn out to vote. However, this system produces more extreme swings in policy as the result of elections and often results in complex coalition governments.

I say all this because US elections always bring out a lot of hand wringing about negative ads, voter disaffection, and low voter turnout. As a political scientist, it is incumbent on me to point out that this is just par for the course. Complaining that politicians don't address issues is like complaining that they don't use drivers while playing miniature golf. They're all on the green making fairly short putts so the difference between winning and losing is the big windmill between them and the hole. (There is some sports cliche about driving for headlines and putting for cash that would be appropriate if the analogy wasn't alreday stretched too thin.) The point here is that much of what pundits complain about in elections is not so much a fall from grace on the part of the candidates as it is a response to the fundamental incentives of our electoral system.

Poltical Rhteoric: I am always personally a bit taken aback when I encounter sincere partisanship. Though there may be profound differences between the activists in each party, elected officials tend to produce policies that appeal to the mainstream of their constituencies, or to groups that are likely to swing the vote. Indeed, the system is designed in such a way that a party's most fervant supporters are likely to get the least policy satisfaction from it. One can see this is the chronic complaints of African Amercicans about the Democrats and the emerging complaints of Christian conservatives about the Republican party.

Because of this, I am forced to admit the logic behind what I consider to be the most distasteful and disegenuous aspect of American politics, i.e., the villification of the opposition. Living in the South, I am constantly exposed to the villification of Democrats who are portrayed as unpatriotic, immoral, and addicted to taxes. Hillary Clinton, for whom there is a palpable dislike, is a good example. It has often seemed to me that most of the talk about Hillary running for President comes from Republicans who see her as a dream opposition candidate. Jerry Falwell was criticized for saying his supporters would as soon vote for her as Satan but, frankly, I never heard truer words from the man.

Yet, when one looks at her Senatorial record, as the New York Post recently did, she comes off as more of centrist than a liberal. Indeed, the New York Post's endorsement of her for reelection expressed the hope that she would stay a senator and not run for president. As if President Hillary would abandon the centrist affectations of Senator Clinton to institute socialism and ban the bible. This is not to say that I am, in any way, a Hillary supporter. I just can't be a Hillary hater because I am personally and professionally convinced that the political system will continue to override any extremist views she may be "concealing".

For this reason, I am particularly dismissive of what I call "partisan noise." A good example of this would be assertions that Democratic victory would make the country less safe. These assertions lack credibility not just because they ignore the similarities of both parties' policies, but because they ignore the source of this similarity. That is, the need of both parties to attract swing voters and to satisfy the demands of the same voters, albeit within the context of not totaly ignoring the more diverse demands of party activists. Given the overwhelming public demand for security and its importance to the electorate, it is hard to imagine major changes in security policy resulting from a partisan power shift.

For this reason, I view US policy as more typically American than Democrat or Republican, and this is a view shared by most of the world. Recent polls have found that there is little international interest in the upcoming elections and most foreign publics see little difference between Democrats and Republicans. For that reason, I am can scarcely credit the Vice President's assertion that the recent violence in Iraq has been an attempt to influence the upcoming election. Beyond the fact that there are causes a plenty inside Iraq to account for the violence, this statement ignores the monolithic view of our political system that prevails in the world, and the very real basis in fact that supports it. Usually, only a change in the person of the President registers with foreign publics on the international polls, much as is the case with a large portion the US public.

The Iraq Issue: This issue is a good example of issue convergence. The American "mainstream" is disaffected with the policy and the administration that produced it. In competitive elections, candidates from both sides have been forced to take a critical stance on the war and the president in one form or another. The upcoming election will have an impact on Iraq policy not so much in terms of who has control of congress. Rather, it will signal to all Representatives and Senators the sensitivity of voters to the issue. If Democrats gain a significant number of seats, potential 2008 candidates in both parties will be encouraged to support revisions in the policy and to take a stand in opposition to (or at least indepedent of) the president. If Republicans hold their own, potential candidates will be less encouraged to do so. In either case, the shadow of 2008 will have more of an impact than the results of 2006.

This is one reason that neither Democrats or Republicans have a "plan" for Iraq. While Republicans may proclaim that Democrats don't have a plan, the shift in rhetoric away from "stay the course" to "establishing benchmarks" and being flexible makes the Republican plan as vague as Democratic alternatives. Both parties have to see how the vote goes in 2006 to determine what will play well in 2008. Right now, both sides offer vague calls for change that vary primarily in the degree of change for which they are calling. I suspect that Democrats as well as Republican are happy that the Baker (and Hamilton) Iraq Study Group will issue its report after the elections when both parties will be better informed about the Iraq issue's impact on actual voters.

Getting Elected: If all this seems a little too self-righteous, it has to be pointed out that the first duty of all politicians is to get elected. To do so they must generally appeal to two different electorates. In the primaries, they must win the votes of the registered members of their parties who tend to be more conservative or liberal than the electorate to whom they appeal in the general election. In both elections, candidates must affirm the values, beliefs and worldviews of these two electorates which conflict with each other and, often, with reality. Very few candidates in competitive elections can reconcile these conflicts with any significant policy alternatives while projecting a distinct image. Most are forced to speak in terms of vague generalities, to emphasize their personal character, and to attack their opponent.

John McCain and Joseph Biden are too of my favorite senators in that they usually approach policy questions in a thoughtful manner that takes into account the complexity of most such issues. However, they both come from "safe" states and only face reelection every 6 years. They can afford the occasional subtlety and nuance in their positions. Largely because of his largely unassailable reord in Vietnam, McCain might stand a chance of being elected president. However, all his past subtlety and naunce will be an albatross around his neck, especially in the primary elections.

To win, he will have to do things that will probably diminish him in my eyes and, I suspect, in his own. The irony here is that he will have to compromise his views to become an uncompromising advocate of the views of the voters. Not to put too fine a point on it, but to win, the electoral system will demand of him on the campaign trail what the Vietnamese couldn't get in the Hanoi Hilton. Of course, in this case the electoral compromise will be for the sake of the greater good not, as was the case in Vietnam, for his own good. However, for a thoughtfully princpled person, sacrifice will be the price of admission and won't guarantee success. Therefore, I always feel a touch of pity for the poltiician.

US Strategy in Iraq

What should US strategy be in Iraq? Clearly, I am not on the ground, or in the loop, or even particularly well informed. However, any IR professor should be able to provide some insight into the parameters of the situation and how it might be resolved. This is my meager attempt.

US Goals:

First of all, we need to define US goals in Iraq. The war was fought primarily to eliminate WMD and remove Saddam Hussein's regime. Those goals have been accomplished (even if the threat of WMDs was exaggerated, we're certain there are none there now). This is really significant because it means we have already achieved our primary objectives, so "winning" is no longer as much of a concern as is "not losing".

Of course, the US had the tertiary objective of building a democracy so that Iraq would be a model for Middle Eastern stability and an ally in the war on terror. What is important to realize here, is that this objectives was not entirely an end in itself. Rather, it was a means to the ends of improving Middle East stability and reducing the threat of terrorism, i.e., al-Qaida. Though Democracy is a worthy end in itself, the US needs to keep its eye on the ball of regional stability and international terrorism.

So, at this point US goals should be as follows:

• Stability in Iraq
• Stability in the region
• Weakening al-Qaida and jihadist movements
• Maintaining US international power and prestige

Others' Goals:

In planning a strategyto achieve these goals, the US needs to take into account the objective of other players in Iraq and the region. We must see that Iraqi Sunnis want security, a share of Iraq's oil wealth, and an equal (if not dominant) voice in Iraq's political system. Iraqi Shia's want security, the oil wealth from their region, a united Iraq, and a dominant voice in its political system. Kurds want security, the wealth from the oil in their region, political autonomy, and perhaps independence. Al-Qaida wants to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq, to discredit and overthrow secular national governments, and expand the caliphate into those areas.

It is important to note that Al-Qaida's goals are not shared by the majority of Iraqis (or Arabs for that matter), especially with regard to security and the survival of Iraq as a nation state. The current fighting, both against US forces and between sects, gives them an opportunity to be defenders of the Sunnis and to recruit members to the effort. To the extent that they are seen a helpful to the Sunni cause and have people involved in their efforts, they hope to convert Iraqi Sunnis their more extreme cause.

Looking past Iraq to the other states in the region, their goals are generally to maintain power in their country, maintain domestic and regional stability, to reduce foreign/Israeli influence in the region, and to maintain foreign support for their regime and economy. In from their point of view, one can see that Al-Qaida and the US can either an their enemy and an ally. Al-Qaida's explicit long term goal is to overthrow these regimes, but in the short term it is actively opposing US influence. US influence is largely unchecked in the region, but is also the most lucrative potential source of foreign support for the regime and economy.

With this in mind, one can see that most nations face a dilemma. They want the US to receive a bloody nose in Iraq as a hedge against further US interference in the region. However, they don't want Iraq to descend into chaos, and they absolutely do not want Al-Qaida strengthened by the conflict. Sectarian violence is also a big concern for most Muslim nations with Shia minorities. Indeed, Hezbollah's recent success against Israel has encouraged serious talk of conciliation between Sunni and Shiites in the region. This trend, along with the Al-Qaida atrocities committed in Iraq, puts these nations at greater odds with Al-Qaida's methods.

Current US Strategy:

Having considered the goals of the various parties, what can we say about current US strategy? Two things should be obvious about the United States efforts to date. First, the US has not committed enough forces to provide security for Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, but has deployed enough troops to create the appearance of occupation and generate opposition to it. Furthermore, the plan to handover security to Iraqis has been behind the power curve of the conflict, and is hamstrung by the lack of legitimacy and capability of the central government. Second, the democratic process in Iraq has failed to produce either a government strong enough to impose security, or an overall political solution to the conflicting demands of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds that fuel the conflict. Indeed, the idea of one person-one vote logically engenders fear among the Sunnis that they will be dominated by the Shia and frustration among Shia at not having the control to which their majority should entitle them.

I am going to eschew deeper criticism of US strategy, partly because there is plenty of it already out there, but partly because I want to focus on the problems of having "victory" as an exit strategy. As Bob Woodward has pointed out, victory is a goal, not a strategy. To say that our "strategy is to achieve victory" is to say that we will "achieve our goals by achieving them". Beyond the obvious tautology, this statement ignores the fact that we have already achieved our major goals and that we are now trying to prevent the costs of our actions from overwhelming their benefits. Ignoring these facts, not only prevents us from devising an effective strategy, but sets unrealistic expectations in the short run. Worse yet, it risks exaggerated domestic and international perceptions of failure in the long run. The administration's "Defeatocrat", "cut and run" rhetoric blocks good strategic planning, endangers domestic support for future conflicts, and may weaken the US's international prestige when we do withdraw. At the risk of putting too fine a point on it, such inflated aims and exaggerated rhetoric threatens to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

Alternatives:

So how do we avoid doing this? Rather than sketching some "pie in the sky" plan of my own, let's consider existing initiatives that might produce pieces of a workable strategy. Howard Baker's Iraq Study Group is considering options that may include shifting the focus from building democracy to establishing security, and involving Syria and Iran in a dialogue about Iraq. There is currently ann Islamic Conference in Mecca that is seeking to reconcile Iraqi Shiite and Sunni religious communities. President Mubarak of Egypt publicly supported this conference and urged participants to work together to stop the sectarian conflict. Syria's president Badr has recently indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel with a neutral (perhaps European) third party. Finally, Iraq's government has implicitly put regional autonomy on the long term agenda by postponing consideration of it for 18 months.

Individually, none of these things will resolve the conflict but, taken together, they suggest that diplomacy is in the air and may be brought down to earth to produce results. However, political actors will only risk engaging in a diplomatic process and committing resources to a settlement if it has a prospect for success. Therefore, US endorsement of some of these diplomatic efforts and participation in others is vital for them to coalesce into something meaningful and productive. Furthermore, such processes will only work if the benefits of them are shared by the participants which, in this case, means that the preponderance of credit for success cannot be expected to go to the US. This will be the a bitter pill that the US will be asked to swallow.

Indeed, it may prove to be the poison pill that may lead the administration to reject it because, in addition, such processes are ill defined, their outcomes are fairly unpredictable, and their results rarely immediately successful. However, such a process would bring in other participants with a stake in preventing the descent of Iraq into chaos and the empowerment of Al-Qaida. Because it is in their own interests, one can reasonably expect these participants to assist the US in leaving Iraq in a condition that does not make it a source for regional instability or a breeding ground for terrorists.

Furthermore, while such participants were unwilling to help the US achieve its main objectives buy invading Iraq, as I have pointed out, the main two US objectives have been achieved and are off the table. Thus, the United States does not face the ultimate danger of seeing its accomplishment of arms bargained away at the negotiating table. In addition, if presented properly, US engagement in a multilateral peace process could receive bi-partisan political support and stabilize domestic popular support for the war. This would actually strengthen the United States' bargaining position and better allow the US to influence the diplomatic process.

While it would be folly to detail a process which I have described as ill defined, one can identify certain key participants that should be included and issues that should addressed. As I have alluded, participants should include nations that have a stake in Iraqi stability. Such nations include most of Iraq's neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iran). Kuwait and Turkey might be involved (or might need to be excluded) due to their animosity to Saddam's regime on the one hand and the Kurds on the other. Non-neighboring, predominantly Muslim states such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia might also be involved. So too might western states such as France, Germany and Russia. Obviously, members of the Coalition (Britain, Japan, Italy, Australia) would want a seat at the table. These participants might not be all included in one framework and their degree of participation might vary dramatically. Indeed, negotiating frameworks, membership, and roles is one of the complex and seemingly unproductive parts of such processes that makes them so unwieldy and uncertain.

Whatever its membership and framework, a successful process would have to address the following concerns:

Political Process: No matter how dysfunctional, Iraq has a democratic system and that gives it international legitimacy. However, democracy is a process that does not guarantee outcomes that are acceptable to all participants. International actors would have the normatively problematic, but strategically imperative task of assuring the various groups in Iraq that their greatest fears will not be realized by the Iraqi political process. This will be problematic because it will involve, at best, interference in the Iraqi government, and, at worst, infringement of Iraqi sovereignty. The US has been unwilling and unable to do this effectively because unilateral interference would appear to be biased and imperialistic. A multinational framework that included nations sympathetic to each of the major Iraqi groups would have more legitimacy and be more effective because it could act more openly.

Economics: The distribution of oil wealth is one issue that can be turned from a zero-sum (win-lose) to a positive sum (win-win) situation by international aid. The Shia factions and Kurdish factions could be asked to make an offer on sharing oil revenue, and oil rich neighbors could be asked to make up most of the difference between what the Shias and Kurds are willing to give and what the Sunnis think they ought to receive. Some kind of financial structure could be set up to monitor sales and revenue sharing. Though the devil would be in the details, in principle the problem is relatively solvable.

Security: At the very least, a multilateral effort could reduce conflict by addressing the issues that cause it. The possibility of deploying troops from non-neighboring muslin countries could also be explored. This could be successful if the Iraqi government genuinely invited them, and they were viewed as acceptable to the dominant groups in the areas to which they were deployed. The key would be to tailor the nationality of the troops to areas in which they are deployed so that they are not seen as an enemy, or an enemy's ally, to the population. Of course, nations will only be induced to contribute troops if there is a real prospect that sectarian violence will decrease, and if their deployment is matched by a reduction in US and British troops. While this might seem as if I am saying that they will only deploy troops when they are no longer needed, the purpose would be to provide an adequate security force without building up an Iraqi Army to the point where it is itself a threat to the Sunnis or Kurds.

US Withdrawal: Despite the rhetoric against withdrawal timetables, the administration has already laid out a withdrawal plan in its slogan of "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Withdrawal of US and British forces is a goal that everyone can agree on, and the maintenance of stability in the wake of a US/UK withdrawal is a goal that everyone except Al-Qaida can agree on. Though the international community has been loathe to help the US extricate itself from a situation they opposed it getting into, the threat of chaos in Iraq and the specter of domestic pressures forcing the US to precipitously withdraw should incline them to become involved. For its part, the US has kept nations that did not support the invasion out of the post war process. The US needs to open up the process and, thus, shift some of the responsibility to the larger group of nations that have a stake in a withdrawal and subsequent stability. Just talking about developing a plan to withdraw and ensure stability in its wake will put the US in a far better light and would focus planning on what we really need to do to call it a victory.

Woodward's Book - State of Denial

I just finished Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War Part III and I want to recommend it to you all. As a rule, I am leery of pro- and anti- Bush books, but Woodward has a reputation for credibility and unparalleled access to decisionmakers that compelled me to read the book. Having read the book, I can't say that my worldview has been dramatically altered, but I do get a feeling that it has been clarified and deepened.

Despite the title and the press buzz, I didn't feel the book was overly organized around a theme or that it drove to a particular conclusion. Rather, it seemed to me that the following themes emerged and competed for attention:

Rumsfeld's conflict with and dominance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jay Garner's Post war planning and experience
Conflicts between DoD, the NSC and State Department
Conflicts over and Incoherence of the post war strategy
Conflicts between Administration representation of the war and the facts on the ground
Bush's insulation from and lack of interest in details of policy
The Administrations use and misuse of intelligence
Rumsfeld is a problem

Of these themes, only two came across to me as projections of Woodward's point of view. The most obvious is the pervasive criticism of Rumsfeld who is depicted as dominating the Joint Chiefs, resisting cooperation with the NSC and Staed Department, and being given free reign by the President. Even though Woodward gives Rumsfeld many opportunities to speak for himself, it is hard come away from the book without seeing Rumsfeld as an obstacle to success. Given the fairly widespread criticism of Rumsfeld, it is likely that the book simply reflects the preponderance of opinion that Woodward encountered in his interviews, but this very preponderance invites the concern that it may be biased. However, such a concern should lead readers to cross examine the book, not to reject it.

The second theme of concern to me was the President's lack of attention to policy. Bush's lack of engagement in policy debates has been frequently reported and will probably be a subject of significant historical debate and analysis. Wooward gives us more examples and also give insight into the ways in which advisors and staff fail to provide information contrary to the administration's operating assumption to the President. The author also reports widespread assessments that Bush focused more on moral support (i.e., cheerleading) than engagement in policy formation. While the depth and breadth Woodward's access to policymakers gives credence to this representation, I was probably receptive to it because it fit my view of the administration, and, therefore, it again set me on edge.

Of greater concern to me, was Woodward's repeated criticism of Bush for not asking more questions. This seemed to be coming from Woodward more than from his sources. At one point in the book, Wooward wonders why Bush didn't ask Gen Abizaid to give him a detailed briefing on his strategy to defeat the anti-coalition fighters (they weren't calling them insurgents yet) and secure Iraq. At other times, when describing meetings in which advisors did not share negative assessments with the President, Woodward points out that Bush also didn't ask for such views. This may be a wholly valid criticism, but it does seem to be mostly Woodward's and should be cross examined more thoroughly.

Despite these reservations, the book is well worth reading. Indeed, given the complexity of its content, I think it would be more of a mistake than usual to rely on excerpts and commentary to understand its content. Furthermore, given the attention a Wooward book typically gets in the political discourse, I think it would be a mistake to ignore its contents. Therefore, I would describe this as a must read even if one must reserve judgment.

Scales Comments on Counterinsurgency FM

Robert Scales, retired general, frequent cable news "talking head", and one of my former commanders, has some interesting comments on the new Counterinsurgency field manual.

Read Scale's comments at http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061009-094036-9129r.htm
(You can download the final draft of the field manual at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf)

I am currently looking over the manual and it appears to be a giant leap forward for US doctrine. However, Scales makes an excellent point:

Gen. DePuy once observed that "doctrine isn't doctrine unless 51 percent of the officer corps believes in it." At last our military has a counterinsurgency blueprint worthy of its powerful antecedents. The question now is whether or not our policy-makers will read it and our military leaders will believe in it enough to put it into practical form.

Dennis Ross' Plan for Iraq

In the last post, I noted that someone had asked THE question about Iraq. Dennis Ross, a former director of policy planning at the State Department, provides part of an answer.

Read his article at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/13/AR2006101301419.html

Ross argues that most of the relevant actors are refusing to confront reality and therfore the poltical process is not working. To start to get it working, Ross thinks three things need to be done.:

1. The national unity conference must be held to adopt the long promised amedments to the constitution that will allay many Sunni concerns.

2. A regional conference of Iraq's neighbors should be held to enlist their support, not in helping the US succeed, but in preventing the chaos which might result from the US failing.

3. A timetable for US withdrawal should be negotiated with the Iraqi to move them towards accepting responsibility for the tasks the US is doing.

Ross makes two comments that really stand out.

"The starting point is to recognize that Iraq is not going to be a democratic, unified country that serves as a model for the region. The violence and the Sunni-Shiite division have already ruled that out. Instead, Iraq could, in the best case, evolve into a country that has the following: a central government with limited powers; provincial governments with extensive autonomy; sharing of oil revenue; and, at the local level, some rough form of representation and tolerance for minorities. In those circumstances Iraq might eventually achieve stability."

He also notes

"No one in Iraq seems to want us there, but everyone is afraid to have us leave. In the meantime, everyone seems willing to sit back, to avoid tackling the tough problems and to let us carry the brunt of the fighting. That has to stop."

Editorial Asks THE Tough Question

There was an opinion piece in the Washington Post that really put its finger on the problem of the debate over Iraq and the problem with policy choices open to the US. As so often is the case, what the author says is fairly obvious, but it just points out the validity of the argument. You can read the whole editorial at the link below. I have quoted the most important two paragraphs in it.

A Dishonest Debate on The Iraq War By Jonathan Finer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601691.html

"For politicians in campaign mode, self-assurance almost always trumps intellectual honesty, so there are few, if any, acknowledged tough calls. But candidates who make an issue of the war could start by addressing problems that have no easy solutions. Those, such as Lamont, who want U.S. troops withdrawn, should explain how they will prevent the resulting vacuum from being filled by Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias -- two groups hellbent on exterminating each other's communities -- as has happened in virtually every region vacated by coalition forces so far..."

"Those who want to maintain the U.S. presence in Iraq -- or even increase it -- have their own explaining to do. They should start with how redistributing or adding troops, whether a few battalions or an entire division, would change what has been an undeniable failure of U.S. forces to control even the terrain in which they are concentrated, such as Baghdad. Periodic "security plans" for the Iraqi capital -- which usually involve shifting thousands of troops from the hinterlands -- have never suppressed violence in a lasting way..."

"Those elected in November will be forced to choose what they consider the least bad option on Iraq from range of policies sure to cause pain. If you've spent any time in Iraq, you're inevitably asked what should be done. After traveling back and forth there since 2003, the most indelible impression I am left with -- aside from the sheer scale of the destruction and suffering -- is that there will be no easy end to this war. Voters are not being prepared for that reality.

A more robust, and honest, dialogue would be a good place to start. If there's one thing we've learned from nearly four years in Iraq it's that glossing over hard questions is the surest path to failure."

Tough Week for the Administration

When it rains, it pours. And information contrary to the White House's point of view on the war has been pouring in from all directions. To help channel the floodwaters (and hopefully to put an end to the rain methaphor), here are some links to some interesting primary sources and news articles.


Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States" dated April 2006
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf
Here is the declassified portion of the NIE that has raised all the ruckus. This is definitely worth reading for yourself. Not only will it help you sort out the spin surrounding it, but I think (based on everything else I have read) it is a fairly valid assessment of the situation.

Maj Gen Batiste's Testimony before Senate Democratic Committee http://polstate.com/?p=4925 The whole transcript of the testimony. Very critical of Rumsfeld

Most Iraqis Favor Immediate U.S. Pullout, Polls Show Leaders' Views Out of Step With Public
By Amit Paley, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601721.html
New polls are suggesting that solid majorities of Iraqi want the US to leave sooner rather than later.

Army Warns Rumsfeld It's Billions Short by By Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-military25sep25,1,1852611.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
Apparently, Gen. Schoomaker is drawing a line in the budget and pushing for a 41% increase in the Army's normal budget to cover the costs of the war. Actually, a kind of gutsy move in the bureaucratic battlespace (bureauspace?).

Unit Makes Do as Army Strives to Plug Gaps by David Cloud, NY Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/us/25infantry.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin
This article focuses on the Second Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division which appears to be suffering from a lack of equipment (as in no tanks) and personnel (as in half of the authorized strength). Explains Gen. Schoomachers concerns (see above).

Succeeding in Phase IV: British Perspectives on the U.S. Effort To Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq By Andrew Garfield, Foreign Policy Research Institue
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060908.military.garfield.britishperspectiveiraq.html
This monograph actually came out a couple fo weeks ago but references to it started popping up thsi week. An in depth analysis of US military efforts in Iraq based on interviews with British officers serving in Iraq. Guaranteed to raise the blood pressure of anyone in the US Army, but ,coming from professional British soldiers on the ground in Iraq, it's a point of view worth considering.

Deficit in the Trade Story

The numbers are in and we hit another record trade deficit in July. What is interesting to me is not so much the deficit but the AP news story about it. The story is okay as far as it goes, but what troubles me is where it doesn't go.

First, we are given lots of numbers defining the absolute size of the trade deficit but this really isn't what is important. What we really need to know is what is the size of the trade deficit relative to GDP. Because GDP is always increaseing, we will frequently be setting new trade defict figures. The question is, is the deficit growing faster or slower than GDP?

Second, the article goes into the sources of the trade deficit and mentions the usual suspects (oil prices and China), but never mentions the real culprit, i.e., the Capital Account. This is the flow of capital into and out of the country and, almost by defintion, it is the opposite of the Current Account which includes the trade deficit. A $776 billion trade deficit implies that there is roughly a $776 Billion surplus in the Capital Account which means that foreign investors have invested $776 billion more in the US than US investors have invested overseas.

The question is, are they buying US stocks and private bonds or are they buying Treasury Bills? If they are making private investments, that just means the US economy is a good risk. However, it is more likely that they are buying the ever increasing quantituy of T-Bills taht the US is issuing to float our government budget.

There can be no doubt that a significant source of the trade deficit is our own budget deficit. But you alsmot never see thsi in the US news.

Trade deficit hits $68B record in July
By MARTIN CRUTSINGER, AP Economics Writer
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060912/ap_on_bi_go_ec_fi/economy

WASHINGTON - The U.S. trade deficit hit a record $68 billion in July as surging global oil prices pushed America's foreign oil bill to the highest level in history.

ADVERTISEMENT

The Commerce Department reported Tuesday that the July deficit jumped 5 percent from the June imbalance. Analysts had expected the deficit to worsen slightly, but the overall imbalance was worse than expected and surpassed the old monthly record of $66.6 billion set last October.

So far this year, the deficit is running at an annual rate of $776 billion, putting the country on course to rack up a record annual deficit for the fifth straight year. Democrats, campaigning for control of Congress in the November elections, hope voters will view the soaring trade deficits as evidence that President Bush's trade policies are not working.

For July, U.S. exports, after setting a string of records, edged down 1.1 percent to $120 billion — still the second highest level in history. Sales of American jetliners, computers and food products all slipped.

Imports rose to a record high of $188 billion, an increase of 1 percent from the June level. America's foreign oil bill climbed 4.8 percent to an all-time high of $28.5 billion, reflecting record oil prices in July.

The politically sensitive deficit with China did decline slightly in July to $19.6 billion but is still on track to far exceed last year's $202 billion deficit, the highest ever recorded with a single country.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson will leave later this week for an Asian trip that will take him to China for his first meetings with Chinese economic officials since he joined the Bush's Cabinet in July.

The administration is pushing China to move more quickly to allow its currency to rise in value against the dollar as a way to narrow the yawning trade gap by making American exports cheaper in China and Chinese goods more expensive for U.S. consumers.

Congressional critics of China's trade policies have warned that if China does not act, they plan to push for a Senate vote before the end of this month on legislation that would impose 27.5 percent penalty tariffs on all Chinese imports.

That would drive up the price American consumers would have to pay for Chinese clothes, toys and consumer electronic products, but supporters of the legislation contend a strong U.S. response is needed to force China to stop manipulating its currency to gain unfair trade advantages.

The big jump in America's oil bill reflects the sharp rise in global oil prices. The average price for a barrel of imported crude oil rose to a record of $64.84 in July while the spot price in global oil markets surged even higher to $77 per barrel.

However, since setting a record in mid-July, crude oil prices have come down by about 13 percent, raising hopes that the trade deficit will start to improve in coming months.

American exporters have been helped by a decline in the value of the U.S. dollar against many major currencies and an improved economic outlook in Europe and Japan.

The drop in exports in July was led by a $1.2 billion decline in sales of U.S. capital goods, reflecting declines in shipments of civilian aircraft, computers and computer accessories and industrial machinery.

While the deficit with China narrowed slightly, America's trade deficit with Japan rose by 8.1 percent in July to $7.6 billion.

The deficit with Canada, America's biggest trading partner, edged up to $5.9 billion while the imbalance with Mexico narrowed to $5.1 billion. The deficit with the 25-nation European Union jumped to $13.4 billion, up from $9 billion in June.

Valuing Immigrants

There is an interesting article in todays paper about a UNC study on the revenue generated by immigrants in NC. http://www.fayettevillenc.com/article?id=241527

The North Caorlina Banker's Association commissioned a study which determined that Hispanics brought $9.2 billion dollars into the state economy.

Of course, the study also estimated that about half the Hispanic immigrants were illegal and that they are generating an $61 million dollar net cost to the state government. However, a little math shows that this shortfall is only 6/10 of a percent of their addition to the economy.

One of the truisms of modern economics is that people are now a nation's most vital natural resource. We need to do away with the old thinking that defines immigrants as a drain on resources and start looking at them as a source of wealth and prosperity in which we should be investing.

Valuing Immigrants

There is an interesting article in todays paper about a UNC study on the revenue generated by immigrants in NC. http://www.fayettevillenc.com/article?id=241527

The North Caorlina Banker's Association commissioned a study which determined that Hispanics brought $9.2 billion dollars into the state economy.

Of course, the study also estimated that about half the Hispanic immigrants were illegal and that they are generating an $61 million dollar net cost to the state government. However, a little math shows that this shortfall is only 6/10 of a percent of their addition to the economy.

One of the truisims of modern economics is that people are now a nations most vital natural resource. We need to do away with the old thinking that defines immigrants as a drain on resources and start looking at them as a source of wealth and prosperity in which we should be investing.

Full Bush Question and Comment

Before anyone complains that I am being too anti-Bush by posting the op ed peice from Arab News, below is the entire question and answer that contained the president's comment that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11.

You can read it a couple of ways. One way would be that the President is not saying here (or, by implication, anywhere else), that Iraq had anything to do with 9/11 but that he was concerned about "preventing threats before they materialized." Or, you could say that the President's rhetoric has Iraq so wrapped up with 9/11 and Al-Qaeda that it is hard to separate them.
(I suppose another point you could make is that he doesn't answer the question.)

You be the judge.




White House Press Conference, Aug 21 2006
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html

Q Quick follow-up. A lot of the consequences you mentioned for pulling out seem like maybe they never would have been there if we hadn't gone in. How do you square all of that?

THE PRESIDENT: I square it because, imagine a world in which you had Saddam Hussein who had the capacity to make a weapon of mass destruction, who was paying suiciders to kill innocent life, who would -- who had relations with Zarqawi. Imagine what the world would be like with him in power. The idea is to try to help change the Middle East.

Now, look, part of the reason we went into Iraq was -- the main reason we went into Iraq at the time was we thought he had weapons of mass destruction. It turns out he didn't, but he had the capacity to make weapons of mass destruction. But I also talked about the human suffering in Iraq, and I also talked the need to advance a freedom agenda. And so my question -- my answer to your question is, is that, imagine a world in which Saddam Hussein was there, stirring up even more trouble in a part of the world that had so much resentment and so much hatred that people came and killed 3,000 of our citizens.

You know, I've heard this theory about everything was just fine until we arrived, and kind of "we're going to stir up the hornet's nest" theory. It just doesn't hold water, as far as I'm concerned. The terrorists attacked us and killed 3,000 of our citizens before we started the freedom agenda in the Middle East.

Q What did Iraq have to do with that?

THE PRESIDENT: What did Iraq have to do with what?

Q The attack on the World Trade Center?

THE PRESIDENT: Nothing, except for it's part of -- and nobody has ever suggested in this administration that Saddam Hussein ordered the attack. Iraq was a -- the lesson of September the 11th is, take threats before they fully materialize, Ken. Nobody has ever suggested that the attacks of September the 11th were ordered by Iraq. I have suggested, however, that resentment and the lack of hope create the breeding grounds for terrorists who are willing to use suiciders to kill to achieve an objective. I have made that case.

And one way to defeat that -- defeat resentment is with hope. And the best way to do hope is through a form of government. Now, I said going into Iraq that we've got to take these threats seriously before they fully materialize. I saw a threat. I fully believe it was the right decision to remove Saddam Hussein, and I fully believe the world is better off without him. Now, the question is how do we succeed in Iraq? And you don't succeed by leaving before the mission is complete, like some in this political process are suggesting.

Arab Point of View

Here is an opinion piece from Arab News that I find interesting not just for its anti-Bush point of view (which is to be expected), but for the depth of its argument. The criticisms here are better thought out than most American Op Ed pieces and more reasonable than many of President Bush's domestic critics.
Click Here For Original Article

Finally, Bush Admits Something We Already Know
Angelo Young, Arab News

President George Bush made a confession at last week’s press conference with the Beltway journalists. He admitted clearly that Iraq had “nothing” to do with the Sept. 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center:

Q: What did Iraq have to do with that?

The president: What did Iraq have to do with what?

Q: The attack on the World Trade Center?

The president: Nothing, except for it’s part of — and nobody has ever suggested in this administration that Saddam Hussein ordered the attack.

The “truthiness” of W’s statement may depend on one’s interpretation of the word “suggested”.

In the years since 9/11, the Bush administration on numerous occasions consciously and misleadingly created a “Nexus of Evil” comprising Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and ominous, cinematic images of anthrax-spewing remote-control airplanes flying over Texas Tudor tract housing in red-state suburbia.

This suggested Saddam-9/11 link was so strong that polling in the run-up to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq had a majority of Americans believing something that has never been found to be true — and probably never will be.

A July 2003 poll by PIPA Knowledge Networks put 70 percent of the American public believing that Saddam orchestrated the Sept. 11 attacks. Two years later, the Harris Interactive polling group showed that 47 percent of Americans still had this false assumption. The administration has never made an effort to clarify this falsehood.

The list of attempts to “suggest” an Iraq-9/11 link began soon after the attacks in New York.

In a Dec. 9, 2001 interview with Tim Russert on NBC’s “Meet the Press”, Vice President Dick Cheney floated the idea that a report “pretty well confirmed” that a senior Iraqi security official met with 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta in Prague in April 2001 prior to the attack on the World Trade Center.

On second thought, strike that.

Bush’s own CIA and FBI both agree, based on phone records and credit card receipts, that Atta was in Florida taking flight lessons at the time. The Iraqi security official in question, Ahmed Kalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, was later in US custody and told interrogators that he never met Atta.

In October 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, Bush stated the following: “Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans — this time armed by Saddam Hussein.”

In a televised address in September 2003, Bush stated that, “Iraq has trained Al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gasses.”

Also in September 2003, Cheney was on television saying that by ousting Saddam, America had “struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who’ve had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.”

(Is it just me that wonders whether Bush realizes that when he calls his American loyalists “the base” of his presidency that in Arabic “the base” translates to “al-qaeda”?)

In January of that year, Cheney called the evidence of a link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda “overwhelming”, citing Iraq’s harboring of Abdul Rahman Yasin, a suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Cheney conveniently left out that in 1998, Iraq offered to turn Yasin over to the FBI in exchange for a statement recognizing that Iraq played no role in that attack. The Clinton administration declined the offer.

Evidence also shows that less than six hours after the 9/11 attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was rallying his staff to find some link to the Iraqi dictator.

A memo obtained by the US media through the Freedom of Information Act shows that an aide to Rumsfeld had written down instructions from the defense secretary to obtain the “best info fast. Judge whether good enough to hit S.H. at same time. Not only UBL ... Sweep it all up. Things related and not.” The initials refer to Saddam Hussein and Usama Bin Laden.

The Iraq hawks in the US media, such as conservative New York Times columnist William Safire, were more than happy to disseminate the idea of Bush’s Nexus of Evil. “The absence of evidence is taken to be evidence of absence,” Safire sniffed at the anti-war crowd in his weekly column on May 19, 2004 (titled “Sarin? What Sarin?”). Indeed, he said, Iraqi nerve toxins had in fact been found: In a 20-year-old Howitzer shell, a fragment of the illegal weapons supplied by the West during the Iran-Iraq war.

Charles Duelfer, a former adviser to the director of the CIA’s Iraq weapons intelligence operations, pointed out that Saddam’s illicit weapons were decommissioned following the UN-sanctioned Gulf War. The UN, under the auspices of multilateral cooperation, destroyed nerve toxin stockpiles housed in these 155-millimeter artillery shells from 1992 to 1994.

The right-wing blowhards from the peanut gallery, such as Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity of Fox News, heralded the discovery of the shell as the smoking gun that legitimized all of Bush’s WMD claims. The “ah-ha-I-told-you-sos” only lasted a few weeks, however, after it became apparent that the discovery of the lone artillery shell wouldn’t lead to a massive underground stockpile of WMDs and a shadowy cabal of Muslim scientists plotting the downfall of Western civilization. The media’s Bush boosters simply moved on to bull-horning other conflations, misrepresentations and half-truths to the American public. (Aluminum tubes, anyone?)

Bush is a man who takes pride in his idée fix , his nuance-less, black-and-white view of the world. He often speaks in a generalist, “with us or against us” terms about issues that are — in the reality outside of his brain — very complicated.

This administration has clearly and consistently sought to find evidence to fit its vague objectives (i.e. “freedom to the Iraqi people”) rather than creating clear objectives that fit the evidence. Sweep it all up. Things related and not.

Meanwhile, the rest of us who know better are forced to takes sides in the false choices that Bush sets up. You’re either for his plan or you love terrorists. You either support the administration’s Middle East policy or you hate freedom. To anyone who hasn’t already been sold a bill of goods by the neocon Republican agenda, these types of statements are wide open for interpretation. (What is freedom? How does one hate it?)

Another telling aspect of Bush’s ambiguous, ignorant, disingenuous use of language emerged last week. Bush defined the US “strategy” in Iraq as: “To help the Iraqi people achieve their objectives and dreams.”

Helping the Iraqi people achieve their objective may be a lofty goal, but it’s not a strategy. A strategy is how one achieves a goal. If the president is so intellectually incapable of distinguishing “strategy” from “goal”, then it’s not a leap of faith to cast doubt on any of the president’s assertions.

The belief that nobody in his administration ever attempted to make a 9/11-Iraq link could only be believed by the most blindly loyal of Bush’s American constituents; his “base” as he has been known to call them: His al-qaeda.

Bush’s latest denial is just the latest of Bush’s many treacherous denials of reality.

Islamic Fascism?

The new turn of phrase from the Bush administration is to label the enemy in the Global War on Terror as Islamic fascists. Does this make sense?

I went to an old class handout on fascism and got the following list of characteristics of fascism:

Irrationalism: people are not rational, need to be led

Social Darwinism: different groups of people are engaged in struggle for survival

Nationalism: individual identifies completely with society, one small part of whole

Glorification of the State: state is vehicle for aspirations of nation/race

Leadership Principle: hierarchy of absolute, totalitarian leadership

Anti-communism: And anti-intellectualism, anti-rationalism, anti-modernism

Racism: central component of National Socialism, not necessarily of fascism

Looking at Al-Qaida, we can see that we have matches with Irrationalism, Totalitarianism and anti-Rationalism/Modernism. The Nationalism and Glorification of the State are obviously different in that Al-Qaida is trying to usurp nationalism and replace it with commitment to Islam. Of course, that is what would make it Islamic fascism. So the label is not too far off the mark for Al-Qaida.

But does this mean it is a good idea to use it? Clearly, it is meant to trigger the negative feelings Americans and Europeans have for fascists and dovetail with assertions that the Global War on Terror is a struggle on the order of WWII. It is also probably meant to draw a distinction between Muslims as a whole and the Muslims the US is fighting.

Will this distinction translate well into Arabic or will the rhetorical shift from fighting "Terrorists" to "Islamic fascists" (after a brief flirtation with the term "War with Radical Islam") only deepen the impression among Muslims that the US is at war with their religion and culture?

Back to Blogging

I neglected this after setting it up in January. Well, time to get back to it.

A couple of days ago, Bernanke, the Fed Chief, addressed the meeting of economists at Jackson Hole. His comments are summed up at http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060825/bs_nm/economy_bernanke_dc

Speaking of US Subsidies

When talking about competitive advantage, I mentioned that the US subsidies industries through its defense spending. Today there is an AP article AP article with a good example of this.

In the US Army Cold Regions Test Center in Alaska, they are testing new vehicle headlights that use LEDs instead of light bulbs. The new headlights will last the life of the vehicle, draw less electricity, penetrate snow better and are easier on the eyes of oncoming cars. The army may equip all its vehicles with them.

So how is this a subsidy? The company that makes them will recoup all its R&D costs from the US and will get its production up an running. It will have a major advantage when bringing the product on to the market. If they are lucky, the product will catch on (like the HUmmer did) and their civilian production will balloon. If they aren't lucky, they at least make moiney off the contract with the Army.

By the way, the Test Center itself is used by American companies (ironically like Daimeler Chrysler) to test cars. It's a smaller subsidy, but access to the center saves them from investing in their own and gives them an advantage over foreign car makers.

Income Glass- Half Empty or Half Full?

What if I told you that the income of the poorest fifth (or 20% ) of Americans grew by 19% in the last twenty years? Would that be a good thing or a bad thing?

According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Economic Policy Institute, it's a bad thing because the income of the middle Fifth grew by 28% and the upper fifth grew by 58%.
See the article on Yahoo news.

On the other hand, one might say that this is just about right. That we are in good hsape when we are worried about whether the poorest fifth's income is rising fast enough (as opposed to rising at all).

The other point to make is that most of the people who were in the bottom fifth twenty years ago aren't there anymore. My daughters are both currently in the bottom fifth as they are just starting off in life. As they gain work experience and education, their income will increase several fold.

Am I saying that we shouldn't not worry about the well being of people in the lowest fifth? Of course we should. However, we shouldn't approach it the way these think tanks are suggesting.

Separating the Wheat from the Chaff

The Democratic Govenors Association released its "America Competes Plan." The plan was accompanied by dire predictions of the US spiralling downward if we didn't take steps to inprove our competitive edge.

But before getting into it, perhaps you should review the plan yourself by Clicking Here.

Okay, if you look at it you might say, "What's wrong with what they are saying?"

First off, the whole thrust of their argument, that America needs to compete, runs counter to the truism that nations don't compete, companies do. A lot of what they are proposing with regard to educationand healthcare is fine (in theory) from the point of view of improving American productivity and our well being. Improving our education system would improve our material well being with or without global trade. Failure to maintain a quality education system won't change the impact of foreign trade, but rather would most likely lead to decline in the growth of our productivity and thus to our wages (agian, trade or no trade).

The hand ringing about level playing fields for American companies is typical protectionist rhetoric and, as is usually the case, has just enough truth in it to elevate it from patently absurd to simply missing the point. Are there subsidies out there that help foreign companies compete with US companies? Sure. Does the US provide subsidies for its companies? The US gov't doesn't provide as many direct subsidies but does provide a lot of support in the form of protection, tax credits, R&D support, and defense spending. We're not the bad guys but our hands aren't clean.

But, more importantly, when a company here or there has trouble competing against a foregin producer, that's the company's problem, not ours as Americans. Case in point, for years the Japanese kept Motorola out of its wireless market through various regulatory measures. Who gained and who lost from this? Clearly, Japanese cell manufacturers gained and Motorola lost. But you have to keep in mind that these are just the producers and you also need to take consumers into account. When you do, you realize that Japanese consumers were hurt by having more expensive cell phones because there were fewer producers (i.e., Motorola) in their market. At the same time, American consumers benefited by having less expensive cell phones because there were fewer consumers (i.e., the population of Japan) in their market.

Herein lies the problem with these competitiveness arguments. They equate our national well being with the well being of our producers whne in fact our well being is more properly equated with the well being of our consumers.

World Economic Forum

The World Economic Forum got underway today in Davos, Switzerland. The forum participants have selected the following questions as the focus of the conference:

- How can China and India maintain sustainable development and manage the environment?

-What immediate steps are needed to address climate change in a changing economic landscape?
- On changing mindsets and attitudes, how can we create a global educational framework that fosters inclusivity?

- In creating future jobs, how should education systems be designed to respond to changing skills requirements?

- On regional identities and struggles: What should be done to close income disparity? How should instability in the Middle East be managed? From the World Economic Forum Website

It is interesting to note that all of these are questions of more of public than economic policy. That is to say that all require some kind of government response.

These questions will be worthy of discussion in our economics class.

Budget Deficit Grows

So we're only two weeks into the new year and we find out that the US is facing a $400 billion budget deficit (click here for article on yahoo).

The question is so what? The real issue is not so much the deficit as the total debt.

According to the Bureau of Public Debt, the total debt is b now about $8.15 Trillion. That's up from $5.8 Trillion in FY2001. (Click here to see the data at the Bureau of Public Debt)

That's a lot of money but again, so what? The key is to compare debt to GDP

Given that current GDP is $12.6 Trillion GDP and in 2001 it was $10.1 Trillion, debt went from 57% of GDP in 2001 to 64% today.(GDP Data at Bureau of Economic Analysis)

Bummer of an increase.

New Year, New Classes, Same Issues

2006 brings with it a new set of classes for me, and an impending congressional election for all of us. Other than that, it looks like we are struggling with the same issues. Here are a few themes that we will be carrying forward.

Iraq: As the Bush administration casts its critics as defeatists who want to cut and run, it gives itself room to start the inevitable draw down. As the election approaches, it will be interesting (if morbidly so) to see this how the contest between military and political needs plays out. Today there is word that the cost of the war may top 1 trillion dollars Click Here--

Terrorism: Unless there is a significant terrorist attack in the US this year, we may a shift in the political debate towards a consideration of the size of the threat versus the costs of the protection. If so, I doubt it will be a thoughtful and reasonable debate, but rather will be akin to debating abortion or gun control. (I often hope I'm wrong on these things.)

Economy: The numbers say that US economy is in good shape but people are fairly pessimistic. Which is right? Though I usually side with the numbers, the ballooning deficit and looming Social Security crisis are real problems in need of solution. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that we will see a solution in 2006.

Globalization: For an academic, the resurgence of socialism is a real riveting event (something worth getting a bowl of popcorn for). This will bear close watching. A good place to start is the opinion piece by Michelle Bechelet at Click Here-

What Happened to the Strategy for Victory?

When I started this blog, the White House had just published its strategy for victory. After making some minor comments, I intended to go on to analyze it in some depth. Silly me, I failed to anticipate how quickly it would be overwhelmed by what pass for events in Washington. At this point I can't see spending any more time on the strategy than on the tax reform commission's report (remember that one?).