It looks as if the White House has finally put diplomacy on the front burner. When I earlier wrote that diplomacy was critically needed, I wasn't sure the administration would move in that direction. In many ways, the recent diplomatic activity is more reassuring than Rumsfeld's replacement. However, it is not yet clear how the diplomacy will play out, especially with regard to three questions:
1. Will the regional powers engage in a process and commit resources in Iraq?
2. Will the US do what is necessary to gain cooperation?
3. What will the US' role be in this process?
First, while Bush's visit to the NATO conference at Riga and then to Jordan is getting the most attention, Cheney's visit to Saudi Arabia is possibly more significant. The Saudi royal family is almost as close to the Bush family as James Baker and they have a huge stake in the region's stability. They also undoubtedly share the administration's concern about Iran's growing influence in the region. If there is to be a regional conference on Iraq, a regional power will probably have to promote it. I have been very curious to see who does so and it may be that the Saudis will be the ones.
Second, while Bush is certainly working the diplomatic front, he is still maintaining the no compromise rhetoric. If you look closely, most of the talk about redeployments, Iran & Syria involvement, and conferences comes from outside the administration. This is probably the White House's preliminary bargaining strategy or at least an attempt to avoid "negotiating with itself". However, Bush has often said that we need to listen to what he says to understand what he is going to do. So there is a seed of doubt in my mind as to whether he will make the compromises that an effective diplomatic process will require.
Of course, with the handling of Rumsfeld's resignation, Bush put the lie to his own advice about listening to what he says. Indeed, the flip side of my concern that he won't compromise is a that he will have to renege on most of what he is saying. If, as was the case with Rumsfeld's resignation, the White House fully intends to do what they are emphatically saying they won't do, then it may lose what little credibility it has left.
This is not to damn Bush if he does and damn him if he doesn't. Rather I mean to damn him if he doesn't make the compromisesthat diplomacy requires, or to damn him for not using the noncommittal language that diplomacy also requires. To me this appears as another case in which the political and communication strategies that put Bush in office, and at which the administration truly excels, are inappropriate for the pursuit of foreign policy. It is going to be difficult for the administration to cooperate with a nation it has declared part of the "Axis of Evil".
Finally, if a diplomatic initiative gets under way, it is not clear that the US will, or should, be in the driver's seat. If there is to be a regional conference, it would be a good thing if it were proposed by a regional power, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt. However, to be effective, a conference will need the participation of all Iraq's neighbors to include Iran and Syria. Just agreeing to a conference with Iran and Syria would require a reversal of policy for the White House and participation will expose the US to criticism of its occupation and demands for withdrawal. Furthermore, there will be the inevitable pressure to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the traditional poison pill for US involvement in Mid East conferences.
It will be interesting to see not only if such a conference can take place, but also how much the US and regional powers are willing to compromise on the above issues. If the regional powers agree to participate without Syria or Iran, or if they agree to avoid issues that embarrass the US, then it will signal an extraordinary interest in resolving the conflict in Iraq. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if a separate regional effort develops to side step the above mentioned obstacles. Indeed, there is the possibility of regional negotiations leaving the US behind if the administration does not get out in front on the diplomacy. Such unity of effort would be a first for the region and so the possibility is more intriguing than likely. Even so, there is so much at stake here in terms of Shia-Sunni relations, opposing Al-Qaida, and balancing Iranian influence, that extraordinary steps may be taken.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
Monday, November 20, 2006
Sea Change on Iraq
What a difference and election makes. Not only did we get Democratic congress, a kinder gentler President, and a new Secretary of Defense, but we also got a major shift in punditry. Charles Krauthammer has shifted from "stay the course/blame the Democrats" to "Accept the inevitable/Blame the Iraqis." More importantly, Henry Kissinger, the major proponent of victory as an exit strategy, now says that military victory is impossible is now calling for an international conference on Iraq.
More importantly, there is activity on the international front. Serious foreign minister has visited Iraq and called for the US to set up a timetable for withdrawal. Following meetings between the Iraq Study Group and Syria Ambassador, this would seem to indicate that Syria is willing to get involved in international efforts such as those suggested by Kissinger (and, dare I say, myself).
The question is how the administration will respond. To be sure, the fact that we are questioning "how" they will respond instead of "if" they will respond is a significant breakthrough. The problem is that we are long past the point where tweaking the strategy or the policy making team will work. Indeed, we are probably past the point where bold innovation on our part alone will work. What we now need is bold efforts all around the cabinet table and around the region. An increased willingness to change and accept compromise on the administration's part is not enough in a situation that calls for bold leadership and aggressive diplomacy.
The point here is that the success or failure the US withdrawal from Iraq is more in the hands of Condalezza Rice than the new guy at the Pentagon. Hopefully, Rumsfeld's resignation will lead the way to more political and diplomatic efforts than military ones. It will be interesting to see what Condi does following the President's trip to Asia. Unfortunately, between North Korea, Iranian nuclear talks, and the traditional Israeli/Palestinian issues, there is a lot in the State Department's inbox. We might need a special envoy, such as Baker, get things done on the diplomatic front.
Meanwhile, back at the Pentagon, the military is reportedly developing options. They are supposedly looking at three options: "Go Big", "Go Long", and "Go Home". Typically, the bold options of "Go Big" and "Go Home" are being rejected out of hand and thus the "Go Long" option is really the only one they are serious about implementing. This option would increase US troops in the short run shift the US into more of a training and advisory role. In other words, committing more effort to the the concept that we have been pursuing for the last couple years.
I find it interesting that the "Go Long" description is being used for this option as going long in football implies taking a bold chance to achieve a touchdown. The plan under consideration bears no resemblance to this. The key to the Pentagon's plan is placing US advisors in Iraqi units as was done in the Vietnam war. Over the last year, several tactical units have been gutted to send their officers and NCO through formal training at Fort Riley to become advisors as part of the Iraq Assistance Group. It is hoped that having advisors in Iraqi units will stiffen up the Iraqi security forces better than having them work with separate American units as we have been doping. So in the end, the "Go Long" plan is more akin to recognizing that we shouldn't have been trying to run the ball with our defensive line and calling time out to bring the offense on the field to run the last play over again.
More importantly, there is activity on the international front. Serious foreign minister has visited Iraq and called for the US to set up a timetable for withdrawal. Following meetings between the Iraq Study Group and Syria Ambassador, this would seem to indicate that Syria is willing to get involved in international efforts such as those suggested by Kissinger (and, dare I say, myself).
The question is how the administration will respond. To be sure, the fact that we are questioning "how" they will respond instead of "if" they will respond is a significant breakthrough. The problem is that we are long past the point where tweaking the strategy or the policy making team will work. Indeed, we are probably past the point where bold innovation on our part alone will work. What we now need is bold efforts all around the cabinet table and around the region. An increased willingness to change and accept compromise on the administration's part is not enough in a situation that calls for bold leadership and aggressive diplomacy.
The point here is that the success or failure the US withdrawal from Iraq is more in the hands of Condalezza Rice than the new guy at the Pentagon. Hopefully, Rumsfeld's resignation will lead the way to more political and diplomatic efforts than military ones. It will be interesting to see what Condi does following the President's trip to Asia. Unfortunately, between North Korea, Iranian nuclear talks, and the traditional Israeli/Palestinian issues, there is a lot in the State Department's inbox. We might need a special envoy, such as Baker, get things done on the diplomatic front.
Meanwhile, back at the Pentagon, the military is reportedly developing options. They are supposedly looking at three options: "Go Big", "Go Long", and "Go Home". Typically, the bold options of "Go Big" and "Go Home" are being rejected out of hand and thus the "Go Long" option is really the only one they are serious about implementing. This option would increase US troops in the short run shift the US into more of a training and advisory role. In other words, committing more effort to the the concept that we have been pursuing for the last couple years.
I find it interesting that the "Go Long" description is being used for this option as going long in football implies taking a bold chance to achieve a touchdown. The plan under consideration bears no resemblance to this. The key to the Pentagon's plan is placing US advisors in Iraqi units as was done in the Vietnam war. Over the last year, several tactical units have been gutted to send their officers and NCO through formal training at Fort Riley to become advisors as part of the Iraq Assistance Group. It is hoped that having advisors in Iraqi units will stiffen up the Iraqi security forces better than having them work with separate American units as we have been doping. So in the end, the "Go Long" plan is more akin to recognizing that we shouldn't have been trying to run the ball with our defensive line and calling time out to bring the offense on the field to run the last play over again.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)