US Goals:
First of all, we need to define US goals in Iraq. The war was fought primarily to eliminate WMD and remove Saddam Hussein's regime. Those goals have been accomplished (even if the threat of WMDs was exaggerated, we're certain there are none there now). This is really significant because it means we have already achieved our primary objectives, so "winning" is no longer as much of a concern as is "not losing".
Of course, the US had the tertiary objective of building a democracy so that Iraq would be a model for Middle Eastern stability and an ally in the war on terror. What is important to realize here, is that this objectives was not entirely an end in itself. Rather, it was a means to the ends of improving Middle East stability and reducing the threat of terrorism, i.e., al-Qaida. Though Democracy is a worthy end in itself, the US needs to keep its eye on the ball of regional stability and international terrorism.
So, at this point US goals should be as follows:
- Stability in Iraq
- Stability in the region
- Weakening al-Qaida and jihadist movements
- Maintaining US international power and prestige
Others' Goals:
In planning a strategyto achieve these goals, the US needs to take into account the objective of other players in Iraq and the region. We must see that Iraqi Sunnis want security, a share of Iraq's oil wealth, and an equal (if not dominant) voice in Iraq's political system. Iraqi Shia's want security, the oil wealth from their region, a united Iraq, and a dominant voice in its political system. Kurds want security, the wealth from the oil in their region, political autonomy, and perhaps independence. Al-Qaida wants to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq, to discredit and overthrow secular national governments, and expand the caliphate into those areas.
It is important to note that Al-Qaida's goals are not shared by the majority of Iraqis (or Arabs for that matter), especially with regard to security and the survival of Iraq as a nation state. The current fighting, both against US forces and between sects, gives them an opportunity to be defenders of the Sunnis and to recruit members to the effort. To the extent that they are seen a helpful to the Sunni cause and have people involved in their efforts, they hope to convert Iraqi Sunnis their more extreme cause.
Looking past Iraq to the other states in the region, their goals are generally to maintain power in their country, maintain domestic and regional stability, to reduce foreign/Israeli influence in the region, and to maintain foreign support for their regime and economy. In from their point of view, one can see that Al-Qaida and the US can either an their enemy and an ally. Al-Qaida's explicit long term goal is to overthrow these regimes, but in the short term it is actively opposing US influence. US influence is largely unchecked in the region, but is also the most lucrative potential source of foreign support for the regime and economy.
With this in mind, one can see that most nations face a dilemma. They want the US to receive a bloody nose in Iraq as a hedge against further US interference in the region. However, they don't want Iraq to descend into chaos, and they absolutely do not want Al-Qaida strengthened by the conflict. Sectarian violence is also a big concern for most Muslim nations with Shia minorities. Indeed, Hezbollah's recent success against Israel has encouraged serious talk of conciliation between Sunni and Shiites in the region. This trend, along with the Al-Qaida atrocities committed in Iraq, puts these nations at greater odds with Al-Qaida's methods.
Current US Strategy:
Having considered the goals of the various parties, what can we say about current US strategy? Two things should be obvious about the United States efforts to date. First, the US has not committed enough forces to provide security for Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, but has deployed enough troops to create the appearance of occupation and generate opposition to it. Furthermore, the plan to handover security to Iraqis has been behind the power curve of the conflict, and is hamstrung by the lack of legitimacy and capability of the central government. Second, the democratic process in Iraq has failed to produce either a government strong enough to impose security, or an overall political solution to the conflicting demands of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds that fuel the conflict. Indeed, the idea of one person-one vote logically engenders fear among the Sunnis that they will be dominated by the Shia and frustration among Shia at not having the control to which their majority should entitle them.
I am going to eschew deeper criticism of US strategy, partly because there is plenty of it already out there, but partly because I want to focus on the problems of having "victory" as an exit strategy. As Bob Woodward has pointed out, victory is a goal, not a strategy. To say that our "strategy is to achieve victory" is to say that we will "achieve our goals by achieving them". Beyond the obvious tautology, this statement ignores the fact that we have already achieved our major goals and that we are now trying to prevent the costs of our actions from overwhelming their benefits. Ignoring these facts, not only prevents us from devising an effective strategy, but sets unrealistic expectations in the short run. Worse yet, it risks exaggerated domestic and international perceptions of failure in the long run. The administration's "Defeatocrat", "cut and run" rhetoric blocks good strategic planning, endangers domestic support for future conflicts, and may weaken the US's international prestige when we do withdraw. At the risk of putting too fine a point on it, such inflated aims and exaggerated rhetoric threatens to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Alternatives:
So how do we avoid doing this? Rather than sketching some "pie in the sky" plan of my own, let's consider existing initiatives that might produce pieces of a workable strategy. Howard Baker's Iraq Study Group is considering options that may include shifting the focus from building democracy to establishing security, and involving Syria and Iran in a dialogue about Iraq. There is currently ann Islamic Conference in Mecca that is seeking to reconcile Iraqi Shiite and Sunni religious communities. President Mubarak of Egypt publicly supported this conference and urged participants to work together to stop the sectarian conflict. Syria's president Badr has recently indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel with a neutral (perhaps European) third party. Finally, Iraq's government has implicitly put regional autonomy on the long term agenda by postponing consideration of it for 18 months.
Individually, none of these things will resolve the conflict but, taken together, they suggest that diplomacy is in the air and may be brought down to earth to produce results. However, political actors will only risk engaging in a diplomatic process and committing resources to a settlement if it has a prospect for success. Therefore, US endorsement of some of these diplomatic efforts and participation in others is vital for them to coalesce into something meaningful and productive. Furthermore, such processes will only work if the benefits of them are shared by the participants which, in this case, means that the preponderance of credit for success cannot be expected to go to the US. This will be the a bitter pill that the US will be asked to swallow.
Indeed, it may prove to be the poison pill that may lead the administration to reject it because, in addition, such processes are ill defined, their outcomes are fairly unpredictable, and their results rarely immediately successful. However, such a process would bring in other participants with a stake in preventing the descent of Iraq into chaos and the empowerment of Al-Qaida. Because it is in their own interests, one can reasonably expect these participants to assist the US in leaving Iraq in a condition that does not make it a source for regional instability or a breeding ground for terrorists.
Furthermore, while such participants were unwilling to help the US achieve its main objectives buy invading Iraq, as I have pointed out, the main two US objectives have been achieved and are off the table. Thus, the United States does not face the ultimate danger of seeing its accomplishment of arms bargained away at the negotiating table. In addition, if presented properly, US engagement in a multilateral peace process could receive bi-partisan political support and stabilize domestic popular support for the war. This would actually strengthen the United States' bargaining position and better allow the US to influence the diplomatic process.
While it would be folly to detail a process which I have described as ill defined, one can identify certain key participants that should be included and issues that should addressed. As I have alluded, participants should include nations that have a stake in Iraqi stability. Such nations include most of Iraq's neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iran). Kuwait and Turkey might be involved (or might need to be excluded) due to their animosity to Saddam's regime on the one hand and the Kurds on the other. Non-neighboring, predominantly Muslim states such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia might also be involved. So too might western states such as France, Germany and Russia. Obviously, members of the Coalition (Britain, Japan, Italy, Australia) would want a seat at the table. These participants might not be all included in one framework and their degree of participation might vary dramatically. Indeed, negotiating frameworks, membership, and roles is one of the complex and seemingly unproductive parts of such processes that makes them so unwieldy and uncertain.
Whatever its membership and framework, a successful process would have to address the following concerns:
Political Process: No matter how dysfunctional, Iraq has a democratic system and that gives it international legitimacy. However, democracy is a process that does not guarantee outcomes that are acceptable to all participants. International actors would have the normatively problematic, but strategically imperative task of assuring the various groups in Iraq that their greatest fears will not be realized by the Iraqi political process. This will be problematic because it will involve, at best, interference in the Iraqi government, and, at worst, infringement of Iraqi sovereignty. The US has been unwilling and unable to do this effectively because unilateral interference would appear to be biased and imperialistic. A multinational framework that included nations sympathetic to each of the major Iraqi groups would have more legitimacy and be more effective because it could act more openly.
Economics: The distribution of oil wealth is one issue that can be turned from a zero-sum (win-lose) to a positive sum (win-win) situation by international aid. The Shia factions and Kurdish factions could be asked to make an offer on sharing oil revenue, and oil rich neighbors could be asked to make up most of the difference between what the Shias and Kurds are willing to give and what the Sunnis think they ought to receive. Some kind of financial structure could be set up to monitor sales and revenue sharing. Though the devil would be in the details, in principle the problem is relatively solvable.
Security: At the very least, a multilateral effort could reduce conflict by addressing the issues that cause it. The possibility of deploying troops from non-neighboring muslin countries could also be explored. This could be successful if the Iraqi government genuinely invited them, and they were viewed as acceptable to the dominant groups in the areas to which they were deployed. The key would be to tailor the nationality of the troops to areas in which they are deployed so that they are not seen as an enemy, or an enemy's ally, to the population. Of course, nations will only be induced to contribute troops if there is a real prospect that sectarian violence will decrease, and if their deployment is matched by a reduction in US and British troops. While this might seem as if I am saying that they will only deploy troops when they are no longer needed, the purpose would be to provide an adequate security force without building up an Iraqi Army to the point where it is itself a threat to the Sunnis or Kurds.
US Withdrawal: Despite the rhetoric against withdrawal timetables, the administration has already laid out a withdrawal plan in its slogan of "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Withdrawal of US and British forces is a goal that everyone can agree on, and the maintenance of stability in the wake of a US/UK withdrawal is a goal that everyone except Al-Qaida can agree on. Though the international community has been loathe to help the US extricate itself from a situation they opposed it getting into, the threat of chaos in Iraq and the specter of domestic pressures forcing the US to precipitously withdraw should incline them to become involved. For its part, the US has kept nations that did not support the invasion out of the post war process. The US needs to open up the process and, thus, shift some of the responsibility to the larger group of nations that have a stake in a withdrawal and subsequent stability. Just talking about developing a plan to withdraw and ensure stability in its wake will put the US in a far better light and would focus planning on what we really need to do to call it a victory.
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