Selectorate Theory

In the Logic of Political Survival, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and Jim Morrow  (hereafter BDM et.al.) (2003) provide a formal model of a polity to examine how political leaders make policies to ensure their political survival. Their Selectorate  Theory, as it has come to be known, yielded so many interesting results and provided such a rich assortment of insights that BDM and Smith went on to write The Dictators' Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics in which they informally summarize the model and apply it to an informal analysis of many phenomena. 

 In the model, the polity consists of three nested and variable groups as well as national leaders and potential challengers for the leadership.  The actors and groups of actors are defined in detail below:

• The Leadership:  This is the individual or group of individuals that have the authority to raise taxes and spend money, either for private gain or for the general welfare of the polity. In a dictatorship or absolutist monarchy, this might be one person.  In other more collective forms of government, it may be a group of people holding various high level position. As a rough approximation for the case of the US, they suggest it might include the President, Speaker of the House and Senate Majority leader. (BDM et. Al., 2003, p. 38-39)
• Challengers: This is the individual or group of individuals that is attempting to depose the incumbent leadership within the “norms” or rules of transition as they exist within the current system. The model assumes that the challenger’s goal is to gain control over policy regarding taxation and spending. The assumption that the challenger is doing so through the norm or rules of the system does not imply that such a transition will be orderly or non-violent as the system’s norms may include coups d’états and executions as accepted means of gaining control. (BDM et. Al., 2003, p 39)
• Residents:  These are the all the members of the polity or the population that comprises it.  They may or may not be members of the Selectorate discussed below. Those who are not are the disenfranchised in the political system.  The proportion of the residents that are included/excluded for the Selectorate provides a means of scaling political systems. (BDM et. Al., 2003 p 39-41)
• Nominal Selectorate (the interchangables):  This is the set of Residents who possess characteristics that, by the government’s rules, qualify them to select the leadership. These qualifying characteristics are defined by governments in varying ways across time and polities, and typically have included aspects of  personal origin (birthplace, lineage), special proficiency (skills, beliefs, knowledge), wealth, and gender and/or age. (BDM et, al., 2003, p 43).  Some characteristics may be naturally occurring or they may be subject to political manipulation (i.e., created, transferred or assigned to people).   The ability to participate in the selection of the leadership also constitutes a necessary condition for seeking private benefits distributed by the Leadership. The most important aspect of being part of the Nominal Selectorate is the opportunity to become part of a Winning Coalition, discussed below (BDM, et. al., 2003, p 42). People who are a member of the selectorate but do not have significant influence over the selection of the leader are referred to as interchangeables (BDM and Smith, 2001, p 5)
• Real Selectorate (the influentials): This is the subset of the Nominal Selectorate who actually choose the actually choose the leadership. These people are referred to as the influentials (BDM and Smith, 2001, p 5)
• Winning Coalition (the essentials): This is the subset of the Selectorate that endows the leadership with sufficient political power over the remainder of the Selectorate and the Residents not included in the Selectorate.  A Winning Coalition must be of some minimal size to provide a sufficiency of power to the Leadership and what exactly constitutes a winning coalition is idiosyncratic to a political system.  In general terms, a Winning Coalition must have at least a majority of the resources used in political competition (be they votes, wealth or armed forces) possessed by the Selectorate. If the relevant resources are evenly distributed across the Selectorate, this will equate to having the support of more than half the Selectorate.  However, if the resources are unevenly distributed, the support of a minority of relatively better endowed members will be sufficient. This group of people is referred to as the essentials (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 5)

It is important to note that the minimum size of the winning coalition is also an important characteristic of political systems. Democracies require large winning coalitions, numbering into the millions, while autocracies require much smaller ones, numbering in the thousands.

Through a formal game theoretic model of political competition, BDM et al derive five rules for political survival that are informally summarized in BDM and Smith (2011):

Rule 1: Keep your winning coalition as small as possible. A small coalition allows a leader to rely on very few people to stay in power. Fewer essentials equals more control and contributes to more discretion over expenditures. (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 17)

Rule 2: Keep your nominal selectorate as large as possible. Maintain a large selectorate of interchangeables and you can easily replace any troublemakers in your coalition, influentials and essential alike. After all, a large selectorate permits a big supply of substitute supporters to put the essentials on notice that they should be loyal and well behaved or else face being replaced. (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 17-18)

Rule 3: Control the flow of revenue. It’s always better for a ruler to determine who eats than it is to have a larger pie from which the people can feed themselves. The most effective cash flow for leaders is one that makes lots of people poor and redistributes money to keep select people– their supporters – wealthy. (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 18)

Rule 4: Pay your key supporters just enough to keep them loyal. Remember, your backers would rather be you than be dependent on you. Your big advantage over them is that you know where the money is and they don’t. Give your coalition just enough so they don’t shop around for someone to replace you and not a penny more. (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 18)

Rule 5: Don’t take money out of your supporter’s pockets to make the people’s lives better off. The flip side of rule 4 is not to be too cheap toward your coalition of supporters. If you’re good to the people at the expense of your coalition, it won’t be long before your “friends” will be gunning for you. Effective policy for the masses doesn’t necessarily produce loyalty among essentials, and it’s darn expensive to boot. (BDM and Smith, 2011, p 18)

In addition to the above rules, BDM at al (2003) find that the Leadership’s choice of providing private benefits to the winning coalition or public goods to the country is driven by the size of the winning coalition. Roughly speaking, leaders can effectively bribe thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of essentials but not millions. Therefore, when faced with the need to gain support of a large winning coalition, as is the case in most democracies, leaders find it necessary to do so through the provision of public goods or good policy.

References:

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James D. Morrow. (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith. (2011) The Dictator’s Handbook: Why bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. New York, NY: Public Affairs.