Iraq Study What?

So a week and two rounds of Sunday talk shows have passed, and the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report has been pummeled worse than Fallujah. While everyone seems to agree with its grim assessment of the situation in Iraq, when it comes to the ISG's recommendations, it appears that everyone has found something to hate.

This has been an early Christmas present for the White Houseas it has shifted media focus from the administration's short comings to those of the ISG. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer has virtually crowed about this being a new opportunity for the president to announce a "bold new strategy". Krauthammer never quite explains what this bold new strategy might be in what appears to be a hope based analysis on his part.

The administration, for its part, has chosen to delay announcing its new strategy until the new Secretary of Defense has been sworn in and gets a chance to travel to Iraq. But supposedly, a decision has been made by the decider in chief. So what's the point of the delay?

I think that the answer is that there is no bold new strategy, just a number of changes in policy more moderate than those proposed by the ISG. It appears that the administration will opt for the Pentagon's middle-of-the-road "Go Long" strategy while applying additional pressure on the Iraqi government to reform. It is doubtful we will see the kind of unfettered diplomacy called for by the ISG or any timetables as called for by the Democrats.

This delay is actually politically shrewd on the administration's part. The ISG report showed is that there is no "bold new strategy" waiting in the wings and that the audience is filled with hecklers. Indeed, to strain the metaphor, the hecklers now seem to be supplied with rotten tomatoes in that the November elections and ISG report have given bi-partisan credibility to criticism of the administration. I can't imagine any strategy that wouldn't ignite a firestorm of criticism once announced.

In another way, time might temporarily be on Bush's side. At this time of year, public attention will shift from Iraq to the holidays, giving some domestic breathing room until the new year. Though it is not a long time, it may be that something will give in Iraqi politics, such as the Shiites ousting Al-Sadr's party from the governing coalition. While such a move wouldn't solve the problem, it would give credibility to a moderate policy change.

I say policy change because the strategy would be the same, i.e., to support the Iraqi government until it can stand on its own. I expect the administration will stick with this strategy while adjusting the tactics it uses. I would expect to see redployments of US combat forces in Iraq, increases in the number of advisors, increases in funding for the Iraqi Army, and general increases in the US Army and Marine Corps. In other words, the changes already under way, along with increased talk about 'benchmarks', will be the 'new' way forward. It's success will depend on what the Iraqis do more than on what the US does and we are left mainly to hope that Iraqi politics will move in the right direction.

The Morning After the Iraq Study Group Report

Actually, it is several mornings after the Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report, but it is the first Sunday morning. In an hour or so the weekly gatherings of TV talking heads will start and we will begin to see the administration's considered spin on the report, as well as the media's.

The last few days has seen the spin move from the report's comprehensive indictment of the administration's Iraq policy to the weaknesses of the group's recommendations. With John McCain and Anthony Zini calling for a more aggressive militray approach, and the Iraqi president rejecting the report out of hand, the ISG's report may be on the defensive more than the administration.

If this is the case, then the adminstration will find it much easier to cherry pick the report (exactly what the ISG sad it shouldn't do). I have heard that the president is planning on giving another speech in a week or so to lay out his new "way forward". This sets off warning bells with me as I consider the administration's defining (if not fatal) flaw to be a belief that it can solve policy problems with speeches rather than actions.

In any case, now is a sort of wait and see period. We need to watch Iraqi domestic politics for either a shift in power or a soldification of Al-Maliki's base. We need to watch regional diplomacy to see if Iraq's call for a conference is heeded. We need to watch American politics to see if Bush makes any real change.

Two additional points: First, I found it interesting (as in I should have seen it coming) that it was the Iraqi's who called for the regional conference. This makes sense from the sovereignty point of view as only the Iraqi government can legally invite others to help in Iraq. However, it is not clear that a Shiite dominated Iraqi government will get Sunni states to the table. It is becoming clear that, as worried about civil strife as they are, the Sunni states are just as worried about Iran expanding its influence in the region. This will complicate the regional diplomatic process as much as will US reluctance to deal with Iran and Syria.

Second, the "Kremlin watching" of the adminstration will be more interesting than ever. With Rumsfeld gone, who will call the shots and to whom can we look for a bold change of policy. Cheney is ever the Iraq hawk and has rumbled about nullifying any attempts by Congress to influence policy. Rice is the administration's star but has been keeping a low profile as the ISG report implicitly ravages her foreign policy. She lacks Baker's realism and thus his zeal for carrying ouot a Diplomatic Offensive in which she must deal with "enemies" such as Syria and Iran. And then there is Gates, the one most prone to change, but in control of the military in a situation that is widely acknowledged to lack a military solution.

Could Bush himself (with his White House aides such as Hadley) drive the policy? It would be uncharacteristically like his father for him to do so. True, he has compromised in the past when faced with overwhelming domestic opposition(e.g., establishing the 9-11 Commission). But can a president whose cabinet meetings Paul O'Neil likened to a "blind man in a room of deaf mutes", assert his control and deftly maneuver the government down an uncertain and ill defined path. Can he gain cooperation of the many states his policies and rhetoric have done so much to alienate. If he could, it would put him in league with FDR and Lincoln just as the historical debate is gravitating towards whether he is as bad as Buchanon (long held to be the worst president in history).

As I say, it will be interesting to see if the adminstration tries to get out in front of the demands for policy change by shifting responsibility to the Iraqis, declaring victory and getting 'out of dodge'. Or, will it try to dress up it's stay until victory policy and spin its way through the next couple of years. The rhetoric to date favors the latter, but then the rhetoric of late has been less reliable. As I say, I will be waiting to see.

Emerging Diplomacy on Iraq

It looks as if the White House has finally put diplomacy on the front burner. When I earlier wrote that diplomacy was critically needed, I wasn't sure the administration would move in that direction. In many ways, the recent diplomatic activity is more reassuring than Rumsfeld's replacement. However, it is not yet clear how the diplomacy will play out, especially with regard to three questions:

1. Will the regional powers engage in a process and commit resources in Iraq?
2. Will the US do what is necessary to gain cooperation?
3. What will the US' role be in this process?

First, while Bush's visit to the NATO conference at Riga and then to Jordan is getting the most attention, Cheney's visit to Saudi Arabia is possibly more significant. The Saudi royal family is almost as close to the Bush family as James Baker and they have a huge stake in the region's stability. They also undoubtedly share the administration's concern about Iran's growing influence in the region. If there is to be a regional conference on Iraq, a regional power will probably have to promote it. I have been very curious to see who does so and it may be that the Saudis will be the ones.

Second, while Bush is certainly working the diplomatic front, he is still maintaining the no compromise rhetoric. If you look closely, most of the talk about redeployments, Iran & Syria involvement, and conferences comes from outside the administration. This is probably the White House's preliminary bargaining strategy or at least an attempt to avoid "negotiating with itself". However, Bush has often said that we need to listen to what he says to understand what he is going to do. So there is a seed of doubt in my mind as to whether he will make the compromises that an effective diplomatic process will require.

Of course, with the handling of Rumsfeld's resignation, Bush put the lie to his own advice about listening to what he says. Indeed, the flip side of my concern that he won't compromise is a that he will have to renege on most of what he is saying. If, as was the case with Rumsfeld's resignation, the White House fully intends to do what they are emphatically saying they won't do, then it may lose what little credibility it has left.

This is not to damn Bush if he does and damn him if he doesn't. Rather I mean to damn him if he doesn't make the compromisesthat diplomacy requires, or to damn him for not using the noncommittal language that diplomacy also requires. To me this appears as another case in which the political and communication strategies that put Bush in office, and at which the administration truly excels, are inappropriate for the pursuit of foreign policy. It is going to be difficult for the administration to cooperate with a nation it has declared part of the "Axis of Evil".

Finally, if a diplomatic initiative gets under way, it is not clear that the US will, or should, be in the driver's seat. If there is to be a regional conference, it would be a good thing if it were proposed by a regional power, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt. However, to be effective, a conference will need the participation of all Iraq's neighbors to include Iran and Syria. Just agreeing to a conference with Iran and Syria would require a reversal of policy for the White House and participation will expose the US to criticism of its occupation and demands for withdrawal. Furthermore, there will be the inevitable pressure to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the traditional poison pill for US involvement in Mid East conferences.

It will be interesting to see not only if such a conference can take place, but also how much the US and regional powers are willing to compromise on the above issues. If the regional powers agree to participate without Syria or Iran, or if they agree to avoid issues that embarrass the US, then it will signal an extraordinary interest in resolving the conflict in Iraq. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if a separate regional effort develops to side step the above mentioned obstacles. Indeed, there is the possibility of regional negotiations leaving the US behind if the administration does not get out in front on the diplomacy. Such unity of effort would be a first for the region and so the possibility is more intriguing than likely. Even so, there is so much at stake here in terms of Shia-Sunni relations, opposing Al-Qaida, and balancing Iranian influence, that extraordinary steps may be taken.

Sea Change on Iraq

What a difference and election makes. Not only did we get Democratic congress, a kinder gentler President, and a new Secretary of Defense, but we also got a major shift in punditry. Charles Krauthammer has shifted from "stay the course/blame the Democrats" to "Accept the inevitable/Blame the Iraqis." More importantly, Henry Kissinger, the major proponent of victory as an exit strategy, now says that military victory is impossible is now calling for an international conference on Iraq.

More importantly, there is activity on the international front. Serious foreign minister has visited Iraq and called for the US to set up a timetable for withdrawal. Following meetings between the Iraq Study Group and Syria Ambassador, this would seem to indicate that Syria is willing to get involved in international efforts such as those suggested by Kissinger (and, dare I say, myself).

The question is how the administration will respond. To be sure, the fact that we are questioning "how" they will respond instead of "if" they will respond is a significant breakthrough. The problem is that we are long past the point where tweaking the strategy or the policy making team will work. Indeed, we are probably past the point where bold innovation on our part alone will work. What we now need is bold efforts all around the cabinet table and around the region. An increased willingness to change and accept compromise on the administration's part is not enough in a situation that calls for bold leadership and aggressive diplomacy.

The point here is that the success or failure the US withdrawal from Iraq is more in the hands of Condalezza Rice than the new guy at the Pentagon. Hopefully, Rumsfeld's resignation will lead the way to more political and diplomatic efforts than military ones. It will be interesting to see what Condi does following the President's trip to Asia. Unfortunately, between North Korea, Iranian nuclear talks, and the traditional Israeli/Palestinian issues, there is a lot in the State Department's inbox. We might need a special envoy, such as Baker, get things done on the diplomatic front.

Meanwhile, back at the Pentagon, the military is reportedly developing options. They are supposedly looking at three options: "Go Big", "Go Long", and "Go Home". Typically, the bold options of "Go Big" and "Go Home" are being rejected out of hand and thus the "Go Long" option is really the only one they are serious about implementing. This option would increase US troops in the short run shift the US into more of a training and advisory role. In other words, committing more effort to the the concept that we have been pursuing for the last couple years.

I find it interesting that the "Go Long" description is being used for this option as going long in football implies taking a bold chance to achieve a touchdown. The plan under consideration bears no resemblance to this. The key to the Pentagon's plan is placing US advisors in Iraqi units as was done in the Vietnam war. Over the last year, several tactical units have been gutted to send their officers and NCO through formal training at Fort Riley to become advisors as part of the Iraq Assistance Group. It is hoped that having advisors in Iraqi units will stiffen up the Iraqi security forces better than having them work with separate American units as we have been doping. So in the end, the "Go Long" plan is more akin to recognizing that we shouldn't have been trying to run the ball with our defensive line and calling time out to bring the offense on the field to run the last play over again.

Elections, Polls, and My Bloodpressure

I am an IR professor and this is an IR blog, but now and then, domestic politics screams out for attention. At election time it screams loudest, and what it screams is usually so at odds with what I know about the world that my blood pressure goes up. So, if only to help lower my BP, here are a few comments on this year's elections.

American Electoral System: We must always keep in mind that the nature of elections is largely driven by the design of the electoral system. In the US, we have single member districts with plurality voting, the so called "first past the post" system. This type of system (wherever it is used) results in two dominant parties which compete for the centrist voters. Therefore, their policy positions tend to converge and, since their is little policy differentiation, there is a dominant focus on personality politics. These systems are known for producing stable majoritarian policy, but also for alientaing many citizens and producing low voter turnout.

This is in contrast to proportional representation systems which feature multiple parties taking distinct policy stands across the political spectrum. Politics in these systems is very issue oriented and the personal charcateristics of elected officials are relatively unimportant. Becuase there is usually a party for every major political persuasion, citizens are more engaged in the system and greater numbers turn out to vote. However, this system produces more extreme swings in policy as the result of elections and often results in complex coalition governments.

I say all this because US elections always bring out a lot of hand wringing about negative ads, voter disaffection, and low voter turnout. As a political scientist, it is incumbent on me to point out that this is just par for the course. Complaining that politicians don't address issues is like complaining that they don't use drivers while playing miniature golf. They're all on the green making fairly short putts so the difference between winning and losing is the big windmill between them and the hole. (There is some sports cliche about driving for headlines and putting for cash that would be appropriate if the analogy wasn't alreday stretched too thin.) The point here is that much of what pundits complain about in elections is not so much a fall from grace on the part of the candidates as it is a response to the fundamental incentives of our electoral system.

Poltical Rhteoric: I am always personally a bit taken aback when I encounter sincere partisanship. Though there may be profound differences between the activists in each party, elected officials tend to produce policies that appeal to the mainstream of their constituencies, or to groups that are likely to swing the vote. Indeed, the system is designed in such a way that a party's most fervant supporters are likely to get the least policy satisfaction from it. One can see this is the chronic complaints of African Amercicans about the Democrats and the emerging complaints of Christian conservatives about the Republican party.

Because of this, I am forced to admit the logic behind what I consider to be the most distasteful and disegenuous aspect of American politics, i.e., the villification of the opposition. Living in the South, I am constantly exposed to the villification of Democrats who are portrayed as unpatriotic, immoral, and addicted to taxes. Hillary Clinton, for whom there is a palpable dislike, is a good example. It has often seemed to me that most of the talk about Hillary running for President comes from Republicans who see her as a dream opposition candidate. Jerry Falwell was criticized for saying his supporters would as soon vote for her as Satan but, frankly, I never heard truer words from the man.

Yet, when one looks at her Senatorial record, as the New York Post recently did, she comes off as more of centrist than a liberal. Indeed, the New York Post's endorsement of her for reelection expressed the hope that she would stay a senator and not run for president. As if President Hillary would abandon the centrist affectations of Senator Clinton to institute socialism and ban the bible. This is not to say that I am, in any way, a Hillary supporter. I just can't be a Hillary hater because I am personally and professionally convinced that the political system will continue to override any extremist views she may be "concealing".

For this reason, I am particularly dismissive of what I call "partisan noise." A good example of this would be assertions that Democratic victory would make the country less safe. These assertions lack credibility not just because they ignore the similarities of both parties' policies, but because they ignore the source of this similarity. That is, the need of both parties to attract swing voters and to satisfy the demands of the same voters, albeit within the context of not totaly ignoring the more diverse demands of party activists. Given the overwhelming public demand for security and its importance to the electorate, it is hard to imagine major changes in security policy resulting from a partisan power shift.

For this reason, I view US policy as more typically American than Democrat or Republican, and this is a view shared by most of the world. Recent polls have found that there is little international interest in the upcoming elections and most foreign publics see little difference between Democrats and Republicans. For that reason, I am can scarcely credit the Vice President's assertion that the recent violence in Iraq has been an attempt to influence the upcoming election. Beyond the fact that there are causes a plenty inside Iraq to account for the violence, this statement ignores the monolithic view of our political system that prevails in the world, and the very real basis in fact that supports it. Usually, only a change in the person of the President registers with foreign publics on the international polls, much as is the case with a large portion the US public.

The Iraq Issue: This issue is a good example of issue convergence. The American "mainstream" is disaffected with the policy and the administration that produced it. In competitive elections, candidates from both sides have been forced to take a critical stance on the war and the president in one form or another. The upcoming election will have an impact on Iraq policy not so much in terms of who has control of congress. Rather, it will signal to all Representatives and Senators the sensitivity of voters to the issue. If Democrats gain a significant number of seats, potential 2008 candidates in both parties will be encouraged to support revisions in the policy and to take a stand in opposition to (or at least indepedent of) the president. If Republicans hold their own, potential candidates will be less encouraged to do so. In either case, the shadow of 2008 will have more of an impact than the results of 2006.

This is one reason that neither Democrats or Republicans have a "plan" for Iraq. While Republicans may proclaim that Democrats don't have a plan, the shift in rhetoric away from "stay the course" to "establishing benchmarks" and being flexible makes the Republican plan as vague as Democratic alternatives. Both parties have to see how the vote goes in 2006 to determine what will play well in 2008. Right now, both sides offer vague calls for change that vary primarily in the degree of change for which they are calling. I suspect that Democrats as well as Republican are happy that the Baker (and Hamilton) Iraq Study Group will issue its report after the elections when both parties will be better informed about the Iraq issue's impact on actual voters.

Getting Elected: If all this seems a little too self-righteous, it has to be pointed out that the first duty of all politicians is to get elected. To do so they must generally appeal to two different electorates. In the primaries, they must win the votes of the registered members of their parties who tend to be more conservative or liberal than the electorate to whom they appeal in the general election. In both elections, candidates must affirm the values, beliefs and worldviews of these two electorates which conflict with each other and, often, with reality. Very few candidates in competitive elections can reconcile these conflicts with any significant policy alternatives while projecting a distinct image. Most are forced to speak in terms of vague generalities, to emphasize their personal character, and to attack their opponent.

John McCain and Joseph Biden are too of my favorite senators in that they usually approach policy questions in a thoughtful manner that takes into account the complexity of most such issues. However, they both come from "safe" states and only face reelection every 6 years. They can afford the occasional subtlety and nuance in their positions. Largely because of his largely unassailable reord in Vietnam, McCain might stand a chance of being elected president. However, all his past subtlety and naunce will be an albatross around his neck, especially in the primary elections.

To win, he will have to do things that will probably diminish him in my eyes and, I suspect, in his own. The irony here is that he will have to compromise his views to become an uncompromising advocate of the views of the voters. Not to put too fine a point on it, but to win, the electoral system will demand of him on the campaign trail what the Vietnamese couldn't get in the Hanoi Hilton. Of course, in this case the electoral compromise will be for the sake of the greater good not, as was the case in Vietnam, for his own good. However, for a thoughtfully princpled person, sacrifice will be the price of admission and won't guarantee success. Therefore, I always feel a touch of pity for the poltiician.

US Strategy in Iraq

What should US strategy be in Iraq? Clearly, I am not on the ground, or in the loop, or even particularly well informed. However, any IR professor should be able to provide some insight into the parameters of the situation and how it might be resolved. This is my meager attempt.

US Goals:

First of all, we need to define US goals in Iraq. The war was fought primarily to eliminate WMD and remove Saddam Hussein's regime. Those goals have been accomplished (even if the threat of WMDs was exaggerated, we're certain there are none there now). This is really significant because it means we have already achieved our primary objectives, so "winning" is no longer as much of a concern as is "not losing".

Of course, the US had the tertiary objective of building a democracy so that Iraq would be a model for Middle Eastern stability and an ally in the war on terror. What is important to realize here, is that this objectives was not entirely an end in itself. Rather, it was a means to the ends of improving Middle East stability and reducing the threat of terrorism, i.e., al-Qaida. Though Democracy is a worthy end in itself, the US needs to keep its eye on the ball of regional stability and international terrorism.

So, at this point US goals should be as follows:

• Stability in Iraq
• Stability in the region
• Weakening al-Qaida and jihadist movements
• Maintaining US international power and prestige

Others' Goals:

In planning a strategyto achieve these goals, the US needs to take into account the objective of other players in Iraq and the region. We must see that Iraqi Sunnis want security, a share of Iraq's oil wealth, and an equal (if not dominant) voice in Iraq's political system. Iraqi Shia's want security, the oil wealth from their region, a united Iraq, and a dominant voice in its political system. Kurds want security, the wealth from the oil in their region, political autonomy, and perhaps independence. Al-Qaida wants to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq, to discredit and overthrow secular national governments, and expand the caliphate into those areas.

It is important to note that Al-Qaida's goals are not shared by the majority of Iraqis (or Arabs for that matter), especially with regard to security and the survival of Iraq as a nation state. The current fighting, both against US forces and between sects, gives them an opportunity to be defenders of the Sunnis and to recruit members to the effort. To the extent that they are seen a helpful to the Sunni cause and have people involved in their efforts, they hope to convert Iraqi Sunnis their more extreme cause.

Looking past Iraq to the other states in the region, their goals are generally to maintain power in their country, maintain domestic and regional stability, to reduce foreign/Israeli influence in the region, and to maintain foreign support for their regime and economy. In from their point of view, one can see that Al-Qaida and the US can either an their enemy and an ally. Al-Qaida's explicit long term goal is to overthrow these regimes, but in the short term it is actively opposing US influence. US influence is largely unchecked in the region, but is also the most lucrative potential source of foreign support for the regime and economy.

With this in mind, one can see that most nations face a dilemma. They want the US to receive a bloody nose in Iraq as a hedge against further US interference in the region. However, they don't want Iraq to descend into chaos, and they absolutely do not want Al-Qaida strengthened by the conflict. Sectarian violence is also a big concern for most Muslim nations with Shia minorities. Indeed, Hezbollah's recent success against Israel has encouraged serious talk of conciliation between Sunni and Shiites in the region. This trend, along with the Al-Qaida atrocities committed in Iraq, puts these nations at greater odds with Al-Qaida's methods.

Current US Strategy:

Having considered the goals of the various parties, what can we say about current US strategy? Two things should be obvious about the United States efforts to date. First, the US has not committed enough forces to provide security for Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, but has deployed enough troops to create the appearance of occupation and generate opposition to it. Furthermore, the plan to handover security to Iraqis has been behind the power curve of the conflict, and is hamstrung by the lack of legitimacy and capability of the central government. Second, the democratic process in Iraq has failed to produce either a government strong enough to impose security, or an overall political solution to the conflicting demands of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds that fuel the conflict. Indeed, the idea of one person-one vote logically engenders fear among the Sunnis that they will be dominated by the Shia and frustration among Shia at not having the control to which their majority should entitle them.

I am going to eschew deeper criticism of US strategy, partly because there is plenty of it already out there, but partly because I want to focus on the problems of having "victory" as an exit strategy. As Bob Woodward has pointed out, victory is a goal, not a strategy. To say that our "strategy is to achieve victory" is to say that we will "achieve our goals by achieving them". Beyond the obvious tautology, this statement ignores the fact that we have already achieved our major goals and that we are now trying to prevent the costs of our actions from overwhelming their benefits. Ignoring these facts, not only prevents us from devising an effective strategy, but sets unrealistic expectations in the short run. Worse yet, it risks exaggerated domestic and international perceptions of failure in the long run. The administration's "Defeatocrat", "cut and run" rhetoric blocks good strategic planning, endangers domestic support for future conflicts, and may weaken the US's international prestige when we do withdraw. At the risk of putting too fine a point on it, such inflated aims and exaggerated rhetoric threatens to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

Alternatives:

So how do we avoid doing this? Rather than sketching some "pie in the sky" plan of my own, let's consider existing initiatives that might produce pieces of a workable strategy. Howard Baker's Iraq Study Group is considering options that may include shifting the focus from building democracy to establishing security, and involving Syria and Iran in a dialogue about Iraq. There is currently ann Islamic Conference in Mecca that is seeking to reconcile Iraqi Shiite and Sunni religious communities. President Mubarak of Egypt publicly supported this conference and urged participants to work together to stop the sectarian conflict. Syria's president Badr has recently indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel with a neutral (perhaps European) third party. Finally, Iraq's government has implicitly put regional autonomy on the long term agenda by postponing consideration of it for 18 months.

Individually, none of these things will resolve the conflict but, taken together, they suggest that diplomacy is in the air and may be brought down to earth to produce results. However, political actors will only risk engaging in a diplomatic process and committing resources to a settlement if it has a prospect for success. Therefore, US endorsement of some of these diplomatic efforts and participation in others is vital for them to coalesce into something meaningful and productive. Furthermore, such processes will only work if the benefits of them are shared by the participants which, in this case, means that the preponderance of credit for success cannot be expected to go to the US. This will be the a bitter pill that the US will be asked to swallow.

Indeed, it may prove to be the poison pill that may lead the administration to reject it because, in addition, such processes are ill defined, their outcomes are fairly unpredictable, and their results rarely immediately successful. However, such a process would bring in other participants with a stake in preventing the descent of Iraq into chaos and the empowerment of Al-Qaida. Because it is in their own interests, one can reasonably expect these participants to assist the US in leaving Iraq in a condition that does not make it a source for regional instability or a breeding ground for terrorists.

Furthermore, while such participants were unwilling to help the US achieve its main objectives buy invading Iraq, as I have pointed out, the main two US objectives have been achieved and are off the table. Thus, the United States does not face the ultimate danger of seeing its accomplishment of arms bargained away at the negotiating table. In addition, if presented properly, US engagement in a multilateral peace process could receive bi-partisan political support and stabilize domestic popular support for the war. This would actually strengthen the United States' bargaining position and better allow the US to influence the diplomatic process.

While it would be folly to detail a process which I have described as ill defined, one can identify certain key participants that should be included and issues that should addressed. As I have alluded, participants should include nations that have a stake in Iraqi stability. Such nations include most of Iraq's neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iran). Kuwait and Turkey might be involved (or might need to be excluded) due to their animosity to Saddam's regime on the one hand and the Kurds on the other. Non-neighboring, predominantly Muslim states such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia might also be involved. So too might western states such as France, Germany and Russia. Obviously, members of the Coalition (Britain, Japan, Italy, Australia) would want a seat at the table. These participants might not be all included in one framework and their degree of participation might vary dramatically. Indeed, negotiating frameworks, membership, and roles is one of the complex and seemingly unproductive parts of such processes that makes them so unwieldy and uncertain.

Whatever its membership and framework, a successful process would have to address the following concerns:

Political Process: No matter how dysfunctional, Iraq has a democratic system and that gives it international legitimacy. However, democracy is a process that does not guarantee outcomes that are acceptable to all participants. International actors would have the normatively problematic, but strategically imperative task of assuring the various groups in Iraq that their greatest fears will not be realized by the Iraqi political process. This will be problematic because it will involve, at best, interference in the Iraqi government, and, at worst, infringement of Iraqi sovereignty. The US has been unwilling and unable to do this effectively because unilateral interference would appear to be biased and imperialistic. A multinational framework that included nations sympathetic to each of the major Iraqi groups would have more legitimacy and be more effective because it could act more openly.

Economics: The distribution of oil wealth is one issue that can be turned from a zero-sum (win-lose) to a positive sum (win-win) situation by international aid. The Shia factions and Kurdish factions could be asked to make an offer on sharing oil revenue, and oil rich neighbors could be asked to make up most of the difference between what the Shias and Kurds are willing to give and what the Sunnis think they ought to receive. Some kind of financial structure could be set up to monitor sales and revenue sharing. Though the devil would be in the details, in principle the problem is relatively solvable.

Security: At the very least, a multilateral effort could reduce conflict by addressing the issues that cause it. The possibility of deploying troops from non-neighboring muslin countries could also be explored. This could be successful if the Iraqi government genuinely invited them, and they were viewed as acceptable to the dominant groups in the areas to which they were deployed. The key would be to tailor the nationality of the troops to areas in which they are deployed so that they are not seen as an enemy, or an enemy's ally, to the population. Of course, nations will only be induced to contribute troops if there is a real prospect that sectarian violence will decrease, and if their deployment is matched by a reduction in US and British troops. While this might seem as if I am saying that they will only deploy troops when they are no longer needed, the purpose would be to provide an adequate security force without building up an Iraqi Army to the point where it is itself a threat to the Sunnis or Kurds.

US Withdrawal: Despite the rhetoric against withdrawal timetables, the administration has already laid out a withdrawal plan in its slogan of "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Withdrawal of US and British forces is a goal that everyone can agree on, and the maintenance of stability in the wake of a US/UK withdrawal is a goal that everyone except Al-Qaida can agree on. Though the international community has been loathe to help the US extricate itself from a situation they opposed it getting into, the threat of chaos in Iraq and the specter of domestic pressures forcing the US to precipitously withdraw should incline them to become involved. For its part, the US has kept nations that did not support the invasion out of the post war process. The US needs to open up the process and, thus, shift some of the responsibility to the larger group of nations that have a stake in a withdrawal and subsequent stability. Just talking about developing a plan to withdraw and ensure stability in its wake will put the US in a far better light and would focus planning on what we really need to do to call it a victory.

Woodward's Book - State of Denial

I just finished Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War Part III and I want to recommend it to you all. As a rule, I am leery of pro- and anti- Bush books, but Woodward has a reputation for credibility and unparalleled access to decisionmakers that compelled me to read the book. Having read the book, I can't say that my worldview has been dramatically altered, but I do get a feeling that it has been clarified and deepened.

Despite the title and the press buzz, I didn't feel the book was overly organized around a theme or that it drove to a particular conclusion. Rather, it seemed to me that the following themes emerged and competed for attention:

Rumsfeld's conflict with and dominance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jay Garner's Post war planning and experience
Conflicts between DoD, the NSC and State Department
Conflicts over and Incoherence of the post war strategy
Conflicts between Administration representation of the war and the facts on the ground
Bush's insulation from and lack of interest in details of policy
The Administrations use and misuse of intelligence
Rumsfeld is a problem

Of these themes, only two came across to me as projections of Woodward's point of view. The most obvious is the pervasive criticism of Rumsfeld who is depicted as dominating the Joint Chiefs, resisting cooperation with the NSC and Staed Department, and being given free reign by the President. Even though Woodward gives Rumsfeld many opportunities to speak for himself, it is hard come away from the book without seeing Rumsfeld as an obstacle to success. Given the fairly widespread criticism of Rumsfeld, it is likely that the book simply reflects the preponderance of opinion that Woodward encountered in his interviews, but this very preponderance invites the concern that it may be biased. However, such a concern should lead readers to cross examine the book, not to reject it.

The second theme of concern to me was the President's lack of attention to policy. Bush's lack of engagement in policy debates has been frequently reported and will probably be a subject of significant historical debate and analysis. Wooward gives us more examples and also give insight into the ways in which advisors and staff fail to provide information contrary to the administration's operating assumption to the President. The author also reports widespread assessments that Bush focused more on moral support (i.e., cheerleading) than engagement in policy formation. While the depth and breadth Woodward's access to policymakers gives credence to this representation, I was probably receptive to it because it fit my view of the administration, and, therefore, it again set me on edge.

Of greater concern to me, was Woodward's repeated criticism of Bush for not asking more questions. This seemed to be coming from Woodward more than from his sources. At one point in the book, Wooward wonders why Bush didn't ask Gen Abizaid to give him a detailed briefing on his strategy to defeat the anti-coalition fighters (they weren't calling them insurgents yet) and secure Iraq. At other times, when describing meetings in which advisors did not share negative assessments with the President, Woodward points out that Bush also didn't ask for such views. This may be a wholly valid criticism, but it does seem to be mostly Woodward's and should be cross examined more thoroughly.

Despite these reservations, the book is well worth reading. Indeed, given the complexity of its content, I think it would be more of a mistake than usual to rely on excerpts and commentary to understand its content. Furthermore, given the attention a Wooward book typically gets in the political discourse, I think it would be a mistake to ignore its contents. Therefore, I would describe this as a must read even if one must reserve judgment.